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Abstract
Measurement is crucial to the implementation of output-based incentive schemes. This
paper uses models to study the performance of teacher quality estimators that enter
teacher incentive schemes. I model an administrator tasked with (i) categorizing teachers
with respect to a cutoff, (ii) retaining teachers in a hidden type environment, and (iii)
compensating teachers in a hidden action environment. The preferred estimator would
be the same in each model and depends on the relationship between teacher quality and
class size. I use data from Los Angeles to show that simple fixed effects would almost
always outperform more popular empirical Bayes.
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Introduction

The vast majority of teacher remuneration is based on credentials and experience (Podgursky
and Springer (2006, 2011)). However, the fact that only a small amount of variation in student
achievement is explained by these characteristics (Hanushek (1986), Goldhaber and Brewer
(1997), Rivkin et al. (2005)) and evidence that teacher quality is an important determinant of
human capital (Hanushek (2011), Chetty et al. (2014a)) have spurred a debate about introducing teacher incentive pay schemes. Such schemes typically take as inputs estimates of teacher
quality,1 prompting a seemingly simple, but clearly germane question: How should teacher
quality be measured in the context of teacher incentive schemes?
At a broad level, the how to best measure quality depends on whether the goal is to predict
teacher quality or to maximize an economic objective. The unbiased sample mean of measured
teacher quality is an obvious candidate. However, the posterior mean of measured teacher
quality is desirable for prediction because it minimizes mean squared error. It accomplishes
this by downweighting, or “shrinking”, the sample mean toward the population mean, which
introduces bias while reducing variance. Lacking any other information about the economic
environment, minimizing mean squared error may seem like a reasonable criterion. Indeed,
this may explain the ubiquity of shrinkage estimators in research and practice (e.g., Rockoff
(2004) and Kane et al. (2008)).2 However, which estimator would be preferred would likely
depend on an educational administrator’s context, which we may know something about. It is
not clear that an estimator with a lower mean squared error would be preferred over one that
is unbiased for all relevant environments. Incentive schemes are predicated on the economic
theory of incentives. As such, it seems that estimators of teacher quality should be evaluated on
the basis of economic—not statistical—theory, which takes into account the relevant context.
This paper combines economic theory and data to examine how to best estimate teacher
quality in the context of a utility maximizing entity, such as a school district administrator. I
consider the ubiquitous “empirical Bayes” estimator, a type of shrinkage estimator,3 and the
unbiased fixed effects estimator, i.e., the sample mean of teacher quality net of other observed
inputs. The aforementioned bias-variance tradeoff emerges whenever comparing unshrunk estimates with shrunken ones. The framework developed in this paper could also be used to
examine the performance of other estimators.
I consider the choice of estimator in three economic environments that are salient for ed1

I refer to “quality” and “value-added” interchangeably.
McCaffrey et al. (2003) write “Early [value-added model] applications . . . primarily used fixed effects, while
more recent applications . . . have used random effects almost exclusively” (64). Note that though empirical
Bayes can be viewed as the outcome of a random effects model, it also possible to shrink fixed effects using a
Bayesian approach.
3
Empirical Bayes estimators are often called BLUP (Best Linear Unbiased Predictor) because they minimize
the mean squared error.
2
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ucation policy. To most closely match the structure of the vast majority of existing schemes,
I start by developing a cutoff-based model where the administrator chooses an optimal cutoff
policy to classify teachers with respect to a desired threshold quality, minimizing the weighted
sum of expected Type I and Type II errors. Each policy specifies a cutoff in the distribution of
that estimator say, for receiving a bonus or not being dismissed. Intuitively, her expected utility is equal to the expected probability of correct classifications, making it natural to compare
estimators based on their expected frequency of mistakes.
The estimators differ by how much they weigh sample data. In the context of estimating
teacher quality, these weights increase in class size. Analysis of the cutoff model shows that the
relationship between class size and teacher quality determines which estimator the administrator
would prefer. The administrator obtains the same expected maximized objective (or “value”)
when class size is constant because empirical Bayes shrinks estimates for all teachers towards
the population mean by the same proportion, preserving teacher rankings. However, if school
principals shift students away from the lowest-quality teachers or assign the highest-quality
teachers to teach small classes of gifted students then class size may depend on teacher quality.
This would cause the performance of the estimators to diverge, even when the administrator
uses estimator-specific optimal cutoff policies. To see why, consider a comparison between two
teachers of different below-average qualities. If the higher-quality teacher is assigned more
students, the larger number of signals about teacher quality increases the empirical Bayes’
weight on their students’ test score gains and decreases the weight on the population mean of
teacher quality, relative to the lower-quality teacher assigned fewer students. In the extreme
scenario where all but one student in a large school are assigned to the higher-quality teacher,
both estimators for that teacher converge to the true value. However, the empirical Bayes
estimate for the lower-quality teacher will likely be close to the population mean, implying that
an administrator using empirical Bayes would likely determine that the lower-quality teacher is
better. I show that the performance of the estimators differs most at the tails of the distribution
of teacher quality under several plausible scenarios, which is important if we seek to identify
either high- or low-quality teachers. For example, in 2010, the former Washington D.C. Schools
Chancellor Michelle Rhee fired 241 teachers based on performance measures (Turque (2010)).
The cutoff model’s close link to existing policy is clearly desirable. However, the cutoff
model does not directly link measurement and output. Therefore, I also use the two main types
of asymmetric information models to directly study how measurement of teacher quality may
affect output. In each model, the administrator chooses an estimator-specific reward policy
function to maximize her objective: output net the cost of the policy. The first is a hidden
type, or adverse selection, model in which unobserved types determine teacher quality. Teacher
quality is a determinant of student human capital and, hence, output, but cannot be exactly
recovered due to measurement error. I show that a reservation-value-, i.e., cutoff-, based policy
3

would emerge in this environment. The optimality of a reservation-value policy suggests a link
between the cutoff and hidden type models. Indeed, I show that the administrator’s preferred
estimator in the hidden type model also depends on class size scenario and, moreover, would
be the same as her preferred estimator in the cutoff model. When class sizes are constant she
would be indifferent, when they are negative quadratic in teacher quality she would prefer fixed
effects, and the opposite when they are positive quadratic. Intuitively, in both the cutoff and
hidden type models the administrator’s value is higher the easier it is to identify teachers above
a particular threshold, and lower the more likely it is that high-quality teachers are estimated
to be below (or low-quality teachers are found to be above) that threshold.
The second asymmetric information model is a hidden action, or moral hazard, model, based
on Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1987). In this model, teachers take an unobserved action which
determines their quality. As in the hidden type model, teacher quality affects output but cannot
be exactly recovered because output is measured with noise. Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1987)
show that the optimal incentive scheme in this environment is linear in the output signal, which
depends on estimated teacher quality. As with the other models, I show that the administrator
would be indifferent between the estimators when class size is constant. I also show that
the administrator can change the scale of the estimator and achieve the same utility. This
means the key link between measurement and choice of estimator is that a negative-quadratic
(positive-quadratic) relationship between class size and teacher quality can be modeled as a
larger (smaller) noise component to an administrator paying teachers using the optimal contract
based on the empirical Bayes estimator. A larger noise component would reduce the strength
of optimal incentives, i.e., piece rate, if agents are risk averse, as teachers likely are. This model
provides an intuitive economics-based response to the sentiment that there is “too much” noise
in teacher quality measures4 : This “big” variance would, in equilibrium, result in a flatter
optimal wage schedule. “Changing the data” by, e.g., shrinking fixed effects estimates would
only lead to an improvement if class size were positive quadratic in teacher quality. Therefore,
as in the cutoff and hidden type models, the administrator’s preferred estimator depends on
the class size scenario and, as in the hidden type model, lines up with her preferred estimator
in the cutoff model.
I also show that the administrator’s preferred estimator would be the same for a much
more general objective, which is increasing in the product of teacher quality (or monotonic
transformation thereof) and the reward assigned to the teacher, where the reward has the
natural property of being nondecreasing in estimated quality.
A distinguishing feature of this paper, relative to the literature, is that for each model I con4

For example, American Federation of Teachers President Randi Weingarten said in a 2012 interview about
releasing VA scores to the public: “I fought against it because we knew value-added was based on a series of
assumptions and not ready for prime-time. But back then, we didn’t realize the error rates could be as high as
50 percent!” (Goldstein (2012)).
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sider the administrator chooses an optimal reward policy function for each estimator. Moreover,
for each model, the administrator’s optimized expected utility, or value, according to either estimator is characterized for a wide range of underlying parameters. This approach answers a
different type of question than one quantifying the effects of potentially suboptimal policies
using estimated models (e.g., Stinebrickner (2001), Tincani (2012), Todd and Wolpin (2012),
Behrman et al. (2016)) or even those with calibrated parameters (e.g., Rothstein (2014)). The
advantage of the approach taken here is that it is possible to compute the preferred estimator—
i.e., the one returning a higher value when coupled with the estimator-specific optimal reward
policy—without knowing the specific parameterization of the relevant model. All that is required
is the relationship between class size and teacher quality. This is feasible because in each environment I consider, the administrator’s problem can be split into two parts: choose a teacher
quality estimator and then choose an estimator-specific optimal policy.
Given the theoretical results, the natural next step is to establish which estimator would
likely be preferred in the real world. Moreover, can we—at least roughly—quantify the extent
to which the choice of estimator matters? As the models show, the former question boils down
to the relationship between class size and teacher quality, which, to my knowledge, has not
been well-established. Therefore, I first make an empirical contribution by documenting this
relationship for the Los Angeles Unified School District—the second-largest school district in
the United States and a district with a large degree of diversity and variation in both student
achievement and class size—using value-added estimates provided by the Los Angeles Times
(Buddin (2011)). I find that class size increases in teacher quality at the low end of the quality
distribution and decreases in teacher quality at the high end; Section 2 shows there is reason
to believe similar relationships between class size and teacher quality may also be present
elsewhere. This is the class size scenario under which fixed effects would be preferred over
empirical Bayes in all the models. However, because the value to the administrator and gain in
output depend on model primitives, without further information this approach cannot quantify
the magnitude of the change according to using one estimator over another.
To address this limitation, I then use the models to compare the prospective performance
of the estimators. First, to approximate the objective of an administrator considering implementing a district-wide cutoff-based incentive scheme, I use values calibrated from Schochet
and Chiang (2012) and the now-documented relationship between teacher quality and class size
in Los Angeles to solve for optimal cutoff policies for a wide range of prospective desired cutoffs
for each estimator. Because the cutoff model has few parameters, I can solve for the preferred
estimator for every desired cutoff, obviating calibrating additional parameters. Fixed effects
would perform better than empirical Bayes for almost every desired cutoff because the empirical relationship I document between class size and teacher quality would cause empirical Bayes
to correctly place fewer teachers of extreme quality in the tails, making it harder to separate
5

them from other teachers. For example, I find that the administrator would make 10% more
classification errors by switching from fixed effects to empirical Bayes to categorize teachers
as being in the bottom percentile in Reading value-added in the Los Angeles Unified School
District. The recent outcry about a case where value-added was incorrectly calculated for 40
teachers in Washington DC, which resulted in at least one firing (Strauss (2013)), suggests that
the public is concerned about misclassifying public school teachers.
Next, I calibrate the additional parameters required to obtain a rough assessment of how the
choice of estimator would affect output in the asymmetric information models. For the hidden
type model, I calibrate a value for the cost of replacing a teacher and compute that using fixed
effects instead of empirical Bayes would increase output by around 0.11-0.22% in a period. For
the hidden action model, I calibrate model parameters using results from Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (2011), an experimental study of teacher incentive pay implemented in Andhra
Pradesh. I find that using fixed effects instead of empirical Bayes would increase output by
1.65% per period. This finding requires making an ancillary, yet interesting, contribution:
using the lens of the hidden action model to interpret the results of this teacher incentive pay
experiment and solve for the optimal strength of incentives in a hidden action environment.
Under fixed effects, the optimal slope of incentives in measured output would be more than six
times higher than it was in the experiment, under the calibrated parameters.
This paper provides evidence that, despite its desirable statistical properties, the most
popular estimator of teacher quality would be outperformed by simpler one. More generally, by
combining knowledge about an administrator’s context with an economic model, we can obtain
much-needed guidance for how to best estimate quality for use in teacher incentive schemes.
With appropriate information about administrator’s preferences and the relationship between
class size and teacher quality, the approach taken here could be used to evaluate the preferred
estimator in other environments. The first steps taken in this paper provide a framework that
could be used to compare the performance of other ways of measuring teacher quality, or other
important economic variables, as well.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background and discusses
related literature. Section 3 develops and analyzes the cutoff model. Section 4 considers the
asymmetric information models: Section 4.1 develops the hidden type model and Section 4.2
illustrates results for a hidden action model. Section 5 presents the quantitative results. Section
6 concludes. The Appendix documents a number of teacher incentive pay schemes and also
contains proofs and further details about the quantitative results.
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Background

Correctly providing incentives in an environment where teachers may vary in both inherent
effectiveness and unobserved effort is a difficult contracting problem, which has caused existing
schemes to adopt several simplifications. First, student test score gains are assumed to separately depend on teacher quality and other inputs, resulting in a value-added model (Hanushek
(1979)). Second, schemes often take the form of cutoff rules that reward (punish) teachers
with estimated value-added above (below) some cutoff. For example, Glazerman et al. (2011)
document that about half of the performance-based schemes drawing on the Teacher Improvement Fund are based on cutoff rules and I find that even a higher share are cutoff-based in
my analysis of existing teacher incentive schemes in Appendix A. Finally, as mentioned above,
decisions are typically based on either fixed effects or empirical Bayes estimates.
Value-Added Models Value-added models are the workhorse of existing teacher incentive
schemes and education research. Due to their pervasiveness, I examine how the most commonly
used estimators of value-added perform when the underlying technology is consistent with a
value-added model. Therefore, this paper has a different focus than research studying how effectively value-added models measure teacher quality (see, e.g., Baker and Barton (2010), Guarino
et al. (2014), Glazerman et al. (2010), and McCaffrey et al. (2003)). Value-added models are a
restricted form of a more general production technology for cognitive achievement (Todd and
Wolpin (2003)), and many authors have tested these restrictions to determine whether they
are good measures of teacher quality, with mixed results. First, some authors have compared
estimates of teacher value-added with and without random assignment of students to teachers
(Kane and Staiger (2008), Kane et al. (2013)) or with subjective ratings of teacher effectiveness
(Jacob and Lefgren (2008)), surmising that value-added models do a reasonably good job of
measuring teacher quality.5 Second, there is also concern that value-added models do not condition on sufficiently rich information about other inputs (Rothstein (2009, 2010), Andrabi et al.
(2011), Jackson (2014)), though the evidence is mixed here as well (Kinsler (2012a), Kinsler
(2012b), Chetty et al. (2014a), Kinsler (2016)). Bond and Lang (2013) question whether valueadded should be ascribed any cardinal meaning at all, noting that monotonic transformations
of test scores can eliminate growth in the black-white reading test score gap.6 Related to this,
Cawley et al. (1999) find a nonlinear (and non-log-linear) relationship between test scores and
wages, which suggests that, consistent with the cutoff model, ranking teachers may be useful.
Although many studies examine the statistical validity of value-added models, none compare
how estimators of value-added perform from the perspective of a utility-maximizing adminis5

Of course, additional data could improve estimates of teacher quality. Teixeira-Pinto and Normand (2009)
develop a method that combines data from binary and continuous variables that predict common outcomes.
6
In this paper, comparisons are made within one academic year.
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trator. Schochet and Chiang (2012) calculate error rates for fixed effects and empirical Bayes
estimators of teacher quality, assuming the same cutoff policy for both estimators. Tate (2004)
notes that ranks formed by fixed effects and empirical Bayes may differ depending on class size,
but does not embed the analysis within a decision problem. Guarino et al. (2015) compare the
performance of fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators, with a focus on how they perform
when students are not randomly assigned to teachers.
Endogenous Class Size The idea that class size can reflect information about teacher quality
has theoretical precedent and empirical support. Jacob and Lefgren (2008) and Lang (2010)
argue that principals know who the good and bad teachers are. Lazear (2001) develops a
theoretical model of class size and teacher quality. Barrett and Toma (2013) assume that higher
quality teachers have a smaller reduction in efficacy for a given increase in class size. Consider
then, a principal wanting to have students pass a low proficiency threshold and increase total
output at her school. The former could cause class size to increase in teacher quality at the
low end of her quality distribution. However, due to the lack of flexible wages in the public
education sector, she may also reduce class size at the high end of the quality distribution to
retain high-quality teachers.
Empirically, many papers have found a relationship between teacher value added and nonmonetary aspects of remuneration. For example, Player (2010) documents that higher quality
teachers have fewer black students, students with learning disabilities, and males—all characteristics related to how difficult it is to teach such students. Clotfelter et al. (2006) show
that highly qualified teachers tend to be matched with more advantaged students. Jepsen and
Rivkin (2009) show that a funding increase resulted in smaller class sizes, though teachers hired
to affect this reduction had less experience. Because these teachers were likely far less effective
than experienced ones, this finding would be consistent with a positive relationship between
class size and teacher quality at the low end of the distribution.
Design of Teacher Incentive Schemes This paper also relates to the literature viewing
teacher payment as a contracting problem, where the administrator chooses the contract that
induces the most effort given that she observes only a noisy measure of output (e.g., student
scores on standardized tests). Barlevy and Neal (2012) combine the earlier literature on tournaments (Lazear and Rosen (1981), Green and Stokey (1983)) and the multi-task problem of
Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1991) to specifically study how best to make comparisons between
teachers serving comparable groups of students.
To most closely match existing incentive schemes, the first part of this paper assumes the
administrator follows a cutoff rule. However, I also show that such a rule could be used to implement a pay-for-percentile-type scheme (Barlevy and Neal (2012)) and, more importantly, would
8

naturally emerge as the optimal policy in a hidden type environment; the latter observation
was also made by Staiger and Rockoff (2010).

3

Cutoff-Based Model

Overview A large body of empirical work evaluates value-added models and compares the
statistical properties of fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators. However, determining
which would be the preferred estimator for making decisions about rewarding or punishing
teachers requires an economic model that posits an objective function for a decision maker.
In this section I develop a cutoff model, which formalizes the objective of a school-district
administrator; characterizes her optimal cutoff policy; and shows the relationship among (i)
how class size varies with teacher quality, (ii) her choice of estimator, and (iii) her expected
maximized utility, i.e., value. To most closely match existing policies, she takes as given an
exogenous desired cutoff (for example, she is told to give bonuses to the top 5% quality teachers
or to fire the lowest 1% quality teachers in the district) and chooses a cutoff policy, which may
depend on estimator type, to maximize her expected objective over all teachers in the district.
I begin with this model for several reasons. First, as will be shown below, her objective
can be measured in terms of the number of correct and incorrect classifications with respect to
the desired cutoff, embedding the administrator’s objective in a natural metric: the expected
number of mistakes. Second, a discrete policy is a natural fit for modeling discrete real-world
policies like retention, making the analysis in this paper highly relevant for the most pervasive,
and perhaps the most contentious, public education policy debates.7 Third, even though they
are not obliged to take such a form, almost all existing teacher incentive schemes for public
school teachers are cutoff-based, making this model’s results applicable to the vast majority
of existing teacher incentive pay schemes; as noted by Stiglitz (1991) and Ferrall and Shearer
(1999), real-world incentive schemes are typically quite simple in structure–even when, in theory,
they should depend on all observed signals (Hölmstrom (1979)). Fourth, related literature
also considers cutoff-based policies, e.g., Staiger and Rockoff (2010), Hanushek (2011), Tincani
(2012), Chetty et al. (2014b), and Rothstein (2014). Finally, the cutoff-based model is extremely
flexible and does not require us to take a stand on what underlies variation in measured output,
which could be heterogeneity in fixed teacher productivity types or unobserved actions. As such,
it can capture relevant economic environments, e.g., as is shown below, one in which teachers
are entered into a tournament (Barlevy and Neal (2012)).
7
Section 4.1.1 explores similarities between the cutoff-based objective and optimal policy in a hidden type
environment.
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Model Specification The administrator receives utility from correctly rewarding a teacher
with true quality equal to or higher than the desired cutoff κ (not making a Type I error)
and not rewarding a teacher with a true quality below κ (not making a Type II error). The
administrator’s utility from using the estimator θ̂ and cutoff policy c on a teacher of true quality
θ is:
uCP (θ, θ̂; c, κ) = α 1{θ̂ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ} +(1 − α) 1{θ̂ < c ∩ θ < κ},
{z
}
|
{z
}
|
avoid Type I error

avoid Type II error

where α and (1 − α) are her weights on not making Type I and II errors, respectively.8 The
parameter α helps link the model to the institutional context. An administrator tasked with
firing the lowest quality teachers might be willing to make many more Type I errors to avoid
a Type II error (i.e., α < 1/2). Alternatively, a high value of α may be more appropriate for
an administrator allocating performance bonuses from a tight budget. If α = 1 − α = 1/2 the
administrator has symmetric preferences, or values Type I and II errors equally.
Teacher quality is distributed according to θi ∼ F = N (0, σθ2 ), where F is known.9 As
discussed in Section 2, the number of students assigned to teacher i, ni , may depend on i’s
quality. For simplicity, I assume that class size depends on θ, where I sometimes denote this
dependence by writing n(θ).10 If class size were instead a noisy signal of teacher quality, the
model solution would be more complicated without changing which estimator the administrator
would prefer. Note that what matters is the end relationship n(θ); whether it is the result of
school principals assigning smaller class sizes to certain teachers or, say, teacher lobbying effort
does not affect the results.
The test score gain for student j assigned to teacher i is yji = θi + ji , where measurement
error ji ∼ N (0, σ2 ) and ji ⊥
⊥ θi . I only adopt this spare technology to simplify model exposition; the quantitative results use value-added estimates that control for many characteristics.
P y
The fixed-effects (FE) estimator of θi is the sample mean, i.e., θ̂iF E = j njii = θi + i , and,


2
given true quality θi , is distributed according to θ̂iF E ∼ N θi , σni . The empirical Bayes (EB)
estimator of teacher value-added updates the prior (i.e., population) distribution of θi with data
{yji }j . Because both the prior distribution and measurement errors are normal the posterior
8

I also analyze a version of the model where the administrator’s objective is increasing in the distance between
teacher quality and the cutoff. The administrator’s preferred estimator would not change. Quantitatively, this
change would inflate the performance difference between the estimators. Results are available upon request.
9
I follow standard assumptions that teacher quality is normally distributed in the population, and that E [θ]
is normalized to 0 and estimated with infinite precision.
10
If the number of students assigned to a teacher was a strictly monotonic function of teacher quality, teacher
rankings could be perfectly recovered by comparing class sizes. Therefore, I assume in this section that the
administrator cannot directly condition on class size; Appendix B.1 provides results for the case where the
administrator may directly incorporate class sizes in her policy. There are two reasons to avoid this direct
conditioning. Including class size would provide school principals with a direct incentive to manipulate class
size, outside of any effects of class size on total output. Additionally, doing so would complicate the scheme,
potentially reducing its attractiveness to policymakers

10

distribution is also normal, giving θ̂iEB = λi θ̂iF E + (1 − λi ) E [θ] = λi θ̂iF E = λi (θi + i ), where
|{z}
0

σθ2
σθ2 +σ2 /ni

λi =
is the ratio of the true variation in teacher quality (the signal) relative to the
estimated variation using the fixed effects estimator (the signal plus noise).11 I express the
dependence of the weights on class size by writing λ(n(θ)) or λ(ni ), or the reduced-form λ(θ),
depending on which is more convenient. How much the empirical Bayes estimator is shifted towards the population mean depends on ni : λ(ni ) → 1 as the number of students observed for a
12
teacher ni increases, causing all the weight to be shifted to the samplehmean.
Note the empiri
EB
= λ(θ)θi 6= θi , but
ical Bayes estimate for a particular teacher’s quality is biased, i.e., E θˆi
also has a lower variance. Though the exposition here is for fixed effects and empirical Bayes
estimators, this bias-variance tradeoff would also apply to comparisons of other shrunken versus
unshrunken estimators.
Expected utility under the fixed effects estimator and candidate cutoff policy cF E integrates
the administrator’s objective over the distributions of teacher quality and measurement error:
h
i
E uCP (θ, θ̂F E ; cF E , κ) = α Pr{θ̂F E ≥ cF E ∩ θ ≥ κ} + (1 − α) Pr{θ̂F E < cF E ∩ θ < κ}
= α Pr{θ +  ≥ cF E ∩ θ ≥ κ} + (1 − α) Pr{θ +  < cF E ∩ θ < κ}
 FE


 FE
Z ∞
Z κ
c
−θ
c
−θ
=α
1−Φ
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ) + (1 − α)
dF (θ|θ < κ),
Φ
σ (n(θ))
σ (n(θ)
κ
−∞
(1)

where σ (n(θ)) ≡ √σ

n(θ)

and F (θ|θ ≥ κ) =

φ(θ/σθ )
σθ (1−Φ(κ/σθ ))

and F (θ|θ < κ) =

φ(θ/σθ )
σθ Φ(κ/σθ )

are the

distribution functions for θ, truncated below and above κ, respectively. Expected utility under
the empirical Bayes estimator and candidate cutoff policy cEB is
h
i
E uCP (θ, θ̂EB ; cEB , κ) = α Pr{θ̂EB ≥ cEB ∩ θ ≥ κ} + (1 − α) Pr{θ̂EB < cEB ∩ θ < κ}
= α Pr{λ(n(θ))θ̂F E ≥ cEB ∩ θ ≥ κ} + (1 − α) Pr{λ(n(θ))θ̂F E < cEB ∩ θ < κ}

 EB

 EB

Z ∞
Z κ
c
c
−
θ
−
θ
λ(n(θ))
1 − Φ  λ(n(θ))
 dF (θ|θ ≥ κ) + (1 − α)
 dF (θ|θ < κ).
=α
Φ
σ (n(θ))
σ (n(θ))
κ
−∞
(2)

For either estimator, an increase in the prospective cutoff policy c decreases the probability
of correctly identifying a teacher with true quality above κ and increases the probability of
correctly identifying a teacher with true quality below κ. The optimal cutoff policy equates
the marginal increase in the probability of committing a Type I error (marginal cost) with the
marginal decrease in the probability of committing a Type II error (marginal benefit). That is,
11

McCaffrey et al. (2003) discusses the differences between fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators.
A common variant of the EB estimator estimates the overall mean of θ. If the overall mean of θ is
not parametrized according to another distribution, the empirical Bayes estimator may not be deemed fully
Bayesian.
12
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c∗EB solves
∞

 ∗EB

1
c
/λ(n(θ)) − θ
φ
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ)
α
λ(n(θ))σ (n(θ))
σ (n(θ))
κ
 ∗EB

Z κ
1
c
/λ(n(θ)) − θ
φ
dF (θ|θ < κ).
= (1 − α)
σ (n(θ))
−∞ λ(n(θ))σ (n(θ))
Z

(3)

The optimal cutoff for the fixed effects estimator c∗F E solves (3), where λ(θ) = 1, ∀θ.
∗F E
Denote the value
to the administrator
of using the hoptimal cutoff policies
and c∗EB as
h
i
i c
FE
EB
vCP
(κ) = E uCP (θ, θ̂F E ; c∗F E , κ) and vCP
(κ) = E uCP (θ, θ̂EB ; c∗EB , κ) , respectively. The
administrator’s value for both estimators is increasing in the signal to noise ratio σθ /σ : as
the variance of the measurement error tends to 0, σ → 0 and all teachers will be correctly
FE
EB
categorized, giving vCP
(κ) = vCP
(κ) = 1 for all desired cutoffs κ (see Appendix B.2 for the
proof).
Although the presentation of the cutoff model is for one classification problem, i.e., (α, κ),
nothing precludes the administrator from performing multiple classification problems simultaneously, each with its own parameterization. For example, the model could also be used to
implement a tournament-based scheme (e.g., “pay-for-percentile-type”, as studied by Barlevy
and Neal (2012)), by allowing for many discrete bonuses, one for each desired κ, which would
correspond to percentiles of the distribution of teacher quality in the ensuing equilibrium. The
bonus for each κ would be an increment above that for the κ immediately below.
Theoretical Results I now characterize the administrator’s value of using each estimator as
a function of the relationship between teacher quality and class size. Proposition 1 shows that
if there is no relationship between teacher quality and class size, the administrator’s value is
the same under both estimators. Next, I consider the case where class size depends on teacher
quality. Proposition 2 shows that, in general, the administrator’s value of the two estimators
depends on the relationship between class size and teacher quality. The administrator’s value
also depends on her Type I and II error weights, α and 1 − α, respectively. For simplicity, α
has been set to 1/2; Appendix B.3 shows this does not drive the findings.
Proposition 1. The administrator receives the same value from both estimators for any desired
cutoff κ when class size is constant.
Proof. If all classes are the same size then λ(n(θ)) = λ ∈ (0, 1), ∀θ. Let c∗F E satisfy the
administrator’s first-order condition (3) when λ = 1. Because λ is constant, then c∗EB = c∗F E λ
FE
EB
also solves (3), and returns the same value (i.e., vCP
(κ) = vCP
(κ)).
Figure 1 illustrates Proposition 1 by plotting the expected utility of the objective under
the fixed effects estimator (solid red line) and the empirical Bayes estimator (dotted blue line)
12

as a function of the cutoff policy for each estimator (x-axis), assuming the same class size
for all teachers. Each curve traces out the administrator’s expected utility as a function of
cutoff policies, given an exogenous desired cutoff quality κ. The left panel corresponds to
a desired cutoff of the first percentile teacher, i.e., κ = F −1 (0.01) < 0, the middle panel
corresponds to a desired cutoff of median teacher quality, i.e., κ = F −1 (0.50) = 0, and the right
panel corresponds to a desired cutoff of the 95th percentile teacher, i.e., κ = F −1 (0.95) > 0.
Extremely low or high cutoff policies cause both estimators to misclassify either all low- or
high-performing teachers, respectively, which is why the administrator’s expected utility is 1/2
at either extreme (recall α = 1/2 in this example). The utility-maximizing cutoff policy for
each estimator is indicated by a vertical line c∗estimator (κ), where the administrator’s value from
∗estimator
using that estimator, vCP
(κ), is the maximum of each curve. Because the curves for both
estimators obtain the same maximum height in each panel, we can see that these are equal when
class size does not vary by teacher quality (i.e., λ(n(θ)) is constant). The utility-maximizing
cutoff policy adjusts to take into account the larger variance of administrator utility under the
∗F E
fixed effects estimator. This is because if c∗F E (= c 1 ) solves (3), |c∗EB | must be smaller than
|c∗F E | to satisfy equation (3), as λ < 1 for the empirical Bayes estimator. In the case where class
size is constant, the optimal cutoff policies for both estimators are at the same quantiles of the
estimator distributions; that is, the same share of teachers are rewarded under both estimators.
For example, when the desired cutoff is the first percentile of teacher quality the cutoff policy
that maximizes expected administrator utility when using fixed effects is below the optimal
cutoff policy when using empirical Bayes (Figure 1a). In contrast, when the administrator
desires to separate the top 5% (95th percentile) from the rest of teachers, the optimal cutoff
policy under the fixed effects estimator is higher than that under the empirical Bayes estimator,
again due to the larger variance of the fixed effects estimator for teacher quality (Figure 1c).
However, this higher variance does not affect the administrator’s value, or maximized expected
utility (maximum height of each curve) because the administrator is risk neutral.13
Proposition 2 considers the case where class size may depend on teacher quality.
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The theoretical results, including Proposition 1, apply to deterministic class size functions; i.e., n(θ) is
degenerate for each θ. If Φ(·) were linear then the results would also apply for the case of i.i.d. class sizes. I
have verified that the results, including estimator rankings, do not appreciably change when the administrator
also integrates over i.i.d. class sizes; e.g., the administrator’s objective under the fixed effects estimator is
!
!
 FE


Z ∞ Z n
Z κ
Z n  FE
c
−θ
c
−θ
α
1−Φ
dGn (n) dF (θ|θ ≥ κ) + (1 − α)
Φ
dGn (n) dF (θ|θ < κ)
σ /n
σ /n
κ
n
−∞
n
  FE

  FE

Z ∞
Z κ
c
−θ
c
−θ
=α
1 − En Φ
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ) + (1 − α)
En Φ
dF (θ|θ < κ),
σ /n
σ /n
κ
−∞
where Gn (·) is a truncated normal random distribution chosen to fit the empirical distribution of class sizes.
Due to the simpler exposition with degenerate class sizes this assumption is maintained. Results are available
upon request.
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Figure 1: Administrator’s objective, assuming constant class size
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Proposition 2. In general, the administrator’s preferred estimator depends on the relationship
between teacher quality and class size.
Proof. Because λ is increasing in n, to simplify exposition I parametrize the empirical Bayes
weights λ directly as a function of θ and then see how changes in this function would affect
the administrator’s utility from using the empirical Bayes estimator. In particular, I assume
there is one slope for the relationship between teacher quality and weight below the population
mean (β− ) and another slope for the relationship above the population mean (β+ ), where either
slope can be positive, negative, or zero. I set σ = 1 for all teachers for the proof of the current
proposition, which does not affect the result; σ varies between teachers in the quantitative
results. Parametrize the empirical Bayes weight according to

δ + β θ
−
−
λ(θ) =
δ + β θ
+

+

if θ < 0
if θ ≥ 0.

Suppose κ < 0 and that c∗EB < 0. The result holds if κ > 0 and c∗EB > 0, using analogous
reasoning. Dividing through by α = 1/2, the administrator’s value is
Z

κ


Φ

−∞




Z 0 
Z ∞ 
c∗EB
c∗EB
c∗EB
− θ dF (θ|θ < κ)+
Φ θ−
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ)+
Φ θ−
dF (θ|θ ≥ κ).
δ− + β − θ
δ− + β − θ
δ+ + β+ θ
κ
0
(4)

Differentiate with respect to β− :
∂v
=
∂β−

where

Z

κ

−∞

∂c∗EB
∂β−

−c∗EB θ
φ
(δ− + β− θ)2




 Z 0



c∗EB
c∗EB θ
c∗EB
− θ dF (θ|θ < κ) +
φ
−
θ
dF
(θ|θ
≥
κ)
,
2
δ − + β− θ
δ − + β− θ
κ (δ− + β− θ)

= 0 due to the Envelope Theorem. The first term is negative because −c∗EB θ < 0

14

for θ < κ. Analogously, the second term is positive. Factoring out the negative sign
the first

 on
c∗EB θ
c∗EB
term, each term is the conditional mean of (δ− +β− θ)2 , weighted by the density φ δ− +β− θ − θ .
∗EB

Typically, the first term dominates, because it represents the conditional mean (δ−c+β−θθ)2 for the
extreme part of the distribution of θ. If the first term dominates then the administrator’s value
is decreasing in β− , i.e., the stronger the increase in class size from teacher quality. Analogously,
by differentiating equation (4) with respect to β+ , we can see that the administrator’s value is
increasing in β+ , meaning that increasing the weight associated with teacher fixed effects for
teachers above the population mean improves the administrator’s value. Note that reducing
the slope of class size in teacher quality for below-average teachers and increasing the slope
of class size in teacher quality for above-average teachers improves the administrator’s utility
from using the empirical Bayes estimator. In particular, if β− > 0 and β+ < 0, the fixed effects
estimator will provide the administrator with higher expected utility.
Figure 2 illustrates Proposition 2 by plotting the administrator’s objective under both estimators (equations (1) and (2)) against candidate cutoff policies (x-axis), but now under the
assumption that class size is an increasing function of teacher quality, implying that β− , β+ > 0,
meaning that lower-quality teachers are weighted closer to the population mean than higherquality teachers. If the administrator desires to separate the lowest quality teachers from the
rest (Figure 2a), the re-weighting inherent in the empirical Bayes estimator can actually reverse
teacher rankings and lead to a lower expected objective for the administrator than when the
fixed effects estimator is used. The opposite is true for when the administrator wishes to separate the top teachers from the rest (Figure 2c)—the peak of the empirical Bayes curve is now
higher than that under the fixed effects estimator. Intuitively, the empirical Bayes estimator
is now dilating the estimated teacher quality further than the fixed effects estimator, reducing
the probability the administrator makes a ranking error. When the administrator only desires
to separate the upper and lower half quality teachers (Figure 2b), fixed effects and empirical
Bayes both obtain the same maximum height, i.e., they return the same expected objective. An
increase in either δ− or δ+ corresponds to an increase in the signal-to-noise ratio. Intuitively,
an increase in the signal provided by student test scores increases λ, reducing the dependence
of the weight on teacher quality.
Figure 3 summarizes the theoretical results for the cutoff model by comparing the performance of the estimators by plotting the ratio in value functions for the administrator
FE
EB
(vCP
(κ)/vCP
(κ)) as a function of the desired cut percentile F (κ) (x-axis), for scenarios where
class size is constant, increasing in teacher quality, negative quadratic in teacher quality, and
positive quadratic in teacher quality (average class size is the same across scenarios). For each
κ, estimator, and class size scenario, I solve for the administrator’s optimal cutoff policy and
FE
EB
plug it into her objective, returning v estimator (κ). The vertical axis then plots vCP
(κ)/vCP
(κ)
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Figure 2: Administrator’s objective, assuming class size increasing in teacher quality
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Figure 3: Difference between administrator’s objective under fixed effects and empirical Bayes,
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0.8

1.0

corresponding to the desired cutoff associated with the desired cut percentile F (κ). As shown
before, when class size is constant (dotted black line), the empirical Bayes cutoff is just a
scaled version of the fixed effects cutoff and the administrator’s value is the same under fixed
FE
EB
effects and empirical Bayes estimators—i.e., vCP
(κ)/vCP
(κ) = 1 for all κ. When class size is
increasing in teacher quality (short-dashed red line), the fixed effects estimator performs better
than the empirical Bayes estimator when the administrator wishes to separate teachers of low
quality from the rest (Figure 2a), while the empirical Bayes estimator performs better when
the administrator wishes to isolate high-quality teachers (Figure 2c). When class size has a
negative-quadratic relationship with teacher quality (dot-dashed blue line), similar to the case
in Proposition 2 where β− > 0 and β+ < 0, it is increasing when teacher quality is low and
decreasing when teacher quality is high; in the example considered in Figure 3, the fixed effects
estimator outperforms the empirical Bayes estimator at both the lowest and highest desired
cutoffs. Finally, when class size is a positive-quadratic function of teacher quality (long-dashed
brown line), the opposite is true. Figure 3 also demonstrates that the difference between the
performance of fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators decreases the closer the desired cut
point is to the population mean of 0. Intuitively, there is less of a difference between both the
estimates resulting from the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators when the administrator seeks to identify teachers as being on either side of the population mean (see Proposition
7 in Appendix B.4 for a proof that the administrator would be indifferent if her problem is
symmetric).
It is important to note that, though the exposition here compares the performance of (unshrunken) fixed effects and (shrunken) empirical Bayes estimators, other Bayesian estimators
could be accommodated by simply changing the prior variance σθ , which would affect the
amount by which the sample mean is shrunk towards the mean.
As noted previously, the cutoff model could be applied to a tournament-based scheme,
e.g., “pay-for-percentile” (Barlevy and Neal (2012)). Therefore, Proposition 2 shows that the
administrator’s objective in such an environment would be lower when using empirical Bayes
when the relationship between class size and teacher quality is negative quadratic, the same
if class sizes were constant, and higher when class size is positive quadratic in teacher quality.
Intuitively, tournament-based schemes rely on ranking teachers, which is harder to do when
lower- and higher-quality teachers are disproportionately shrunk towards the population mean
(i.e., class size is negative quadratic in teacher quality).
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4
4.1

Asymmetric Information Models
Hidden Type Model

This section shows how results from the cutoff-based model studied in Section 3 can be thought
of in terms of a hidden type, or adverse selection, environment.14 It starts by considering a
general version, Model HT-G, which derives the administrator’s optimal policy when she can
observe a fairly general output signal. In the cutoff model the administrator was assumed to
follow a cutoff policy. In contrast, this section shows that such a policy would emerge as the
optimal one in a general hidden type environment. This is useful because if a certain type of
policy is optimal for the general signal in Model HT-G then it would also be optimal for the
specific estimators considered in subsequent sections.
4.1.1

Model HT-G

There are T periods, indexed by t, and J classrooms, or slots, indexed by j, where slot j has
nj students. As in the cutoff model, the administrator can provide rewards (or sanctions) to
teachers, but class sizes may be determined by school principals. As in the real world, the
administrator conditions on quality signals, but not directly on other data, e.g., class sizes.15
Let I denote the set of potential teachers, or applicants, who are indexed by i. Per-student
output from slot j being filled by teacher i in period t is qit = β0 + θi(j,t) , where θi is teacher i’s
quality and output for slot j is zero if it has not been assigned a teacher (i.e., i(j, t) = ∅). The
quality of applicants for teaching positions is distributed according to θi ∼ N (µ, σθ2 ), where, as
in the cutoff model, µ = 0. Any teacher i in the applicant pool would accept a teaching job if
offered a wage at least as high as w. As in Staiger and Rockoff (2010), there is an arbitrarily
large number of teachers for each slot. This is not very restrictive because a change in the
distribution of teacher quality could be modeled by suitably adjusting the distribution of θ.
Teacher quality is not observed by the administrator, who, after the end of each period only
observes a noisy signal of mean output q̂it ∼ Gq̂ (q̂it |qit ). As in the cutoff model, the distribution
of the output signal depends on true output q. However, I make a weaker assumption here,
that Gq̂ satisfies the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), which is consistent with
many distributions of measurement error on output—in particular, normally distributed errors
(Karlin and Rubin (1956)), which are ubiquitous in value-added models. Hiring a teacher costs
χ output, where χ > 0. Let It denote the subset of I who are employed as teachers in t. Let
Hit denote the history of signals for teacher i that are observed at the beginning of period t,
i.e., Hit = {q̂iτ }τ <t , where the number of previous signals for i is |Hit |.
14

This environment is partially based on one developed in Staiger and Rockoff (2010). See page 2 of their
Online Appendix.
15
Appendix B.1 examines a problem where the administrator can directly use class size in her policy.
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In each period, the administrator chooses a hiring policy ψh,t (·) and a reward policy ψr,t (·) to
maximize her expected objective, where ψr,t (·) consists of a wage wi(j,t) , paid at the beginning
of the period, and a retention decision, made after that period’s signals have been realized.
The administrator chooses {ψh,t (·), ψr,t (·)}t∈T to maximize expected discounted total output,
net the cost of her policy:
"
uHT G =

X
t

δ t−1 Et

!#
X

qi(j,t),t − wi(j,t) − 1{|Hi(j,t),t | = 0}χ

,

(5)

j

where δ is the discount rate, Et [·] denotes the expectation using information available at period
t, and |Hi(j,t),t | = 0 means i is a new hire in period t.
Theoretical Results For simplicity, assume β0 = 0 and set w = 0.16 Then, ψh,t (·) will be
a list of |Jt | random numbers for indices i ∈ I/It , where Jt denotes the set of empty slots at
the beginning of period t (i.e., Jt = J in the first period and then the slots with just-dismissed
teachers thereafter). Now consider the administrator’s choice of how to reward a given portfolio
of teachers, ψr (·). In general, ψr (·) could depend on all signals (i.e., from the most recent and
also earlier periods) of all currently employed teachers, and may have a complicated functional
form. Proposition 3 greatly simplifies the solution.
Proposition 3. The administrator’s optimal policy ψr,t (·), for i ∈ It , will have the reservation
value property consisting a stopping region and, if Gq̂ satisfies the MLRP, a continuation region
above.
Proof. First, note that the additive separability of (5) implies we can split it into J separate
problems. Lippman and McCall (1976) proves that the optimal policy for each problem has
a reservation value property (see also Rothschild (1974)). Examination of (5) shows that the
administrator’s objective is increasing in output qit , and therefore also increasing in expected
it |q̂it ]
> 0, i.e., the posterior mean of a teacher’s
output. If the MLRP holds, this implies that ∂ E[q
∂ q̂it
quality is increasing in signal q̂it . Then, there will then be a region in which the administrator
will retain the teacher (i.e., a continuation region) and below which she will pay χ to replace
her (i.e., a stopping region). Finally, within the continuation region note that the administrator
would not gain from paying additional wages per each slot, meaning that ψr,t will feature a wage
payment of wψr,t = w = 0 and the retention decision will have a reservation value property. Also
note that variation in nj does not affect the optimality of a reservation value policy, provided
Gq̂ satisfies the MLRP.
16

This assumption is consistent with the administrator leaving no slots empty. An alternative would be to
assume β0 is such that the administrator would find it optimal to fill an empty slot j with a random hire from
the pool of applicants, i.e., expected output is β0 + E [θ] = β0 + µ > χ + w. This would encumber the notation
without changing the result.
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The optimality of a reservation-value policy is typical of optimal stopping problems, of
which the current model is an example, and suggests a link with the cutoff model from Section
3. However, the administrator’s objective (5) is quite general, which complicates obtaining
theoretical results about how the administrator would prefer to measure teacher quality and
relating results from the hidden type model to those from the cutoff-based model. Therefore, in
Section 4.1.2 I study Model HT-0, a version of Model HT-G with two periods and constant class
sizes. Model HT-1, in Appendix C.1, shows how a multi-period model, which allows teachers
to become more productive as they gain experience, can be mapped into a series comprised of
the second period of different HT-0 models. Model HT-2, in Appendix C.2, extends HT-0 to
examine the case of variable class sizes. As with Model HT-0, a multi-period version of Model
HT-2 could be related back to the second period of Model HT-2.
4.1.2

Model HT-0

There are two periods (T = 2) and teacher quality is fixed over time. Each slot j holds n > 0
students, which corresponds to the constant class size scenario for the cutoff-based model.
Output per slot is noisily measured according to q̂jit = qjit + jit , where jit ∼ N (0, σ2 /n) and
2
E [jit |qjit ] = E [jit ] = 0. Let ρ = σθ2 /(σθ2 + σn ) be the signal reliability, i.e., the amount of
information about teacher quality in the output measure.
Theoretical Results As with Model HT-G, in the first period the administrator hires at
random from the pool of potential teachers. Therefore, I focus on the second period and
suppress the period subscript t and discount rate δ. In the second period she can choose
to either retain or replace each teacher i ∈ I1 based on information from the first period.
Proposition 3 shows the optimal solution has a reservation value property. Our goal then is to
characterize the marginal signal q in the distribution of first-period signals q̂.
Per slot, the administrator’s second-period objective from reservation value policy q on
signal q̂ is




1{q̂ < q} (E [q|new hire] −χ) + 1{q̂ ≥ q} E q|q̂ ≥ q = 1{q̂ < q}(E [θ|new hire] −χ)+1{q̂ ≥ q} E θ|q̂ ≥ q .
{z
}
|
|
{z
} |
{z
}
dismiss teacher; fill slot immediately

=µ=0

retain teacher

(6)
Taking expectations over the signal q̂, we can write the administrator’s value of using estimator
q̂ with replacement cost χ as
q̂
vHT
0 (χ)


= max Φ
q

q
σq̂




(−χ) + 1 − Φ



q
σq̂





E θ|q̂ ≥ q .

(7)

By setting q̂ = θ̂F E , the sample mean of each teacher’s observed signals during the first
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period, we can then use (7) to write the administrator’s value from using the fixed effects
estimator:
!
!!
FE
FE
q
q
σθ2 φ(−q F E /σθ̂F E )
FE
vHT
(χ)
=
max
Φ
(−χ)
+
1
−
Φ
,
(8)
0
σθ̂F E
σθ̂F E
σθ̂F E Φ(−q F E /σθ̂F E )
qF E
h

FE

FE

i

σ2

φ(−q F E /σ

)

= σ FθE Φ(−qF E /σθ̂FF EE )
using the result for a truncated bivariate normal distribution, E θ|θ̂ ≥ q
θ̂
θ̂
(see Greene (2003)).
We could solve for the reservation signal q ∗F E by differentiating (8) with respect to q F E
and setting the resulting first-order condition to zero. However, we can also characterize the
marginal signal q ∗F E by noting the administrator would be indifferent between replacing or
retaining a teacher with that signal. The administrator’s expected utility from replacing
slot
h
i
FE
j’s teacher is E [θ] −χ = −χ and her expected utility from retaining j’s teacher is E θ|θ̂
,
which is equal to (1 − ρ)µ + ρθ̂F E = ρθ̂F E by Bayes rule. The administrator will then replace
FE
. This expression has a clear intuition. First, suppose
teacher i if and only if − χρ ≡ q ∗F E > θ̂i(j,1)
that χ = 0. Then the marginal teacher is of average quality of the existing stock of teachers;
since hiring in the first period is random from the pool of applicants this means any teacher
with quality expected to be below the population average (µ) would be replaced. Increasing χ
would lower this threshold.
4.1.3

Relation Between Preferred Estimator in Cutoff and Hidden Type Models

The cutoff-based model in Section 3 has the advantage of being simple and embedding the
administrator’s objective in an intuitive, policy-relevant measure: the weighted sum of classification errors. This section shows how results from the cutoff-based model may also obtain
in the hidden type environment. There are two main cases, corresponding to the class size
scenarios covered by the propositions in Section 3.
Constant n When class sizes are constant the administrator is indifferent between using
either estimator. This is formalized in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4. The administrator receives the same value from both estimators for any replacement cost χ when class size is constant.
Proof. To obtain the administrator’s value from using the empirical Bayes estimator q̂ = θ̂EB ≡
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λHT 0 θ̂F E , where λHT 0 ≡ ρ, adapt (7) for the distribution of λHT 0 θ̂:
EB
vHT
0 (χ)

!

= max Φ

q EB
σθ̂EB

= max Φ

q EB
ρσθ̂F E

q EB

q EB

(−χ) +

1−Φ

!
(−χ) +

1−Φ

q EB
σθ̂EB

!!

σθ2 φ(−q EB /σθ̂EB )
ρ
σθ̂EB Φ(−q EB /σθ̂EB )
!!
q EB
σθ2 φ(−q EB /(ρσθ̂F E ))
ρ
ρσθ̂F E
ρσθ̂F E Φ(−q EB /(ρσθ̂F E ))

(9)

where the second line follows because σθ̂EB = ρσθ̂F E . Then, if q ∗F E solves (8) then q ∗EB = ρq ∗F E
FE
must solve (9) and, notably, return the same value for the administrator, i.e., vHT
0 (χ) =
EB
vHT
0 (χ).
Therefore, as with Proposition 1 for the cutoff model, in Model HT-0 the administrator
would obtain the same value from using either estimator when class sizes are the same for all
teachers. Note also that the optimal empirical Bayes reservation signal q ∗EB is shrunk toward
the population mean by exactly the same amount as was the optimal empirical Bayes cutoff
policy, suggesting an equivalence in optimal policies in the cutoff-based model and HT-0. We
can show this by setting κ = −χ and finding a Type I error weight αequiv such that c∗F E (κ =
−χ, αequiv ) = q ∗F E (χ). Then it will also be the case that c∗EB (κ = −χ, αequiv ) = q ∗EB (χ).
Model HT-1, in Appendix C.1, shows how the results for Model HT-0—in particular, its
relation to the cutoff-based model—can be extended to allow for multiple periods and changes
in teacher output over time, say, due to the accumulation of teaching experience. Specifically,
we can map Model HT-1 to a version of Model HT-0. This is formalized in Proposition 5.
Proposition 5. Model HT-1 can be mapped to Model HT-0.
Proof. See Appendix C.1.
Thus, the administrator would be indifferent in her choice of estimator for HT-0 or HT-1,
i.e., when class size is constant.
Variable n Ideally, we would know that if an estimator would be preferred for every parameterization of the cutoff model, given a class size scenario, it would also be preferred for any
hidden type environment for that class size scenario. Propositions 1, 4, and 5 show this is the
case with constant class sizes. Model HT-2 extends Model HT-0 to allow for nonconstant class
sizes (see Appendix C.2 for details). As was the case for the cutoff model, when class sizes
are variable the preferred estimator depends on other primitives. Proposition 3 implies that
the optimal policy in HT-2 would still have the reservation value property, so as long as the
MLRP is maintained. This, combined with the fact that the administrator would prefer fixed
effects to empirical Bayes for almost every parameterization of the cutoff model when n(θ) is
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negative quadratic and would prefer the opposite when n(θ) is positive quadratic (Proposition
2), suggests the administrator would also prefer fixed effects in model HT-2 under the negativequadratic scenario and would prefer empirical Bayes under the positive-quadratic scenario; i.e.,
the same ranking over estimators by class size scenario would also obtain for HT-2.
I confirmed this intuition by computing the preferred estimator for a range of parameterizations of Model HT-2, i.e., replacement costs χ. For brevity, the explicit model and results are
presented in Appendix C.2. The results are strikingly similar between the cutoff and hidden
type models: (i) which estimator the administrator would prefer depends on n(θ) (same as in
the cutoff model), (ii) the preferred estimator does not depend on the specific parameterization
of HT-2, other than the shape of n(θ) (same as in the cutoff model), and (iii) given n(θ), the
administrator would prefer the same estimator in the cutoff model as she would in HT-2. That
is, I find that the preferred estimator in the cutoff model, which depends on the class size
scenario n(θ), would also be preferred in model HT-2, regardless of the values of other model
parameters. Naturally, we might model an increase in T by decreasing χ (from the two-period
model), as replacing teachers would become relatively less costly when compared to the future
gains in output. Then, the fact that the administrator would have the same preferred estimator
for HT-2 suggests that she would also prefer the same estimator for multi-period versions of
HT-2. It is important to note that, while Model HT-2 has two periods, a similar transformation
to that done in Model HT-1 could be used to model multiple periods and potential changes in
teacher output due to experience. If an estimator was preferred in each period then it would also
be preferred when calculating the discounted value of the administrator’s dynamic objective.
There is an intuition for why the administrator would prefer the same estimator in the
cutoff and hidden type models. The administrator will have a higher value when there are
fewer Type I errors, i.e., teachers with high true quality appearing below the reservation signal,
because the cost of replacing them will be lower. At the same time, fixing the share of teachers
not retained, the administrator will have a higher objective coming from fewer Type II errors,
i.e., teachers with low true quality appearing above the reservation signal, because output will
be higher. A negative-quadratic relationship between teacher quality and class size would,
therefore, lead the administrator to prefer to use fixed effects over empirical Bayes in both the
cutoff model and Model HT-2. Appendix E shows that an administrator with a much more
general objective would also prefer fixed effects over empirical Bayes when n(θ) was negative
quadratic and empirical Bayes when n(θ) was positive quadratic.

4.2

Hidden Action Model

As discussed previously, many teacher incentive schemes—although cutoff-based—are predicated on inducing higher effort levels from teachers, i.e., moral hazard/hidden actions. This
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section therefore presents the workhorse CARA-Normal model of moral hazard, as developed
in Bolton and Dewatripont (2005), to illustrate the potential role choice of estimator may play
in affecting output in a hidden action setting. This model assumes the contract is linear, which
need not be optimal. However, the solution of this model is the same as that in Hölmstrom and
Milgrom (1987), which studies a static one-period model split into a number of sub-periods,
where in each sub-period an agent (i.e., teacher) controls chooses the probability of success for a
binomial random variable. In particular, Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show that the optimal
contract is linear, featuring an end-of-period payment that is a linear function of aggregated
signals. The interpretation for an education context would be that, in each infinitesimal unit
of time, the teacher could exert more or less effort to increase the probability a student obtains
a sub-period-specific “bit” of human capital, which is measured by an end-of-year exam.
Model Specification There is one period. The administrator has utility q − w, where q is
output and w is the wage paid to the teacher. The teacher has constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility −e−ξ(w−ψ(a)) , where ξ is their coefficient of absolute risk-aversion and the cost
of exerting effort a is ψ(a) = γa2 /2. The teacher requires an expected utility of u to participate.
Output from teacher i depends on teacher quality according to qi = θi , where teacher quality
θi = ai + νi . The term ai is the teacher’s endogenous effort level and the error νi ∼ N (0, σν2 ) is a
productivity shock common to students taught by the teacher; ν could correspond to a teacherclassroom-specific match effect. Assume ν can be observed by the school principal, meaning
there may be a relationship between teacher quality and class size, as in the other models. The
teacher chooses a, without knowing the realization of ν. Average output for teacher i is noisily
measured according to an average test score q̂i = qi + i = θi + i = ai + νi + i . Note that the
risk-neutrality of the administrator’s objective implies that she can solve a separate problem
for each teacher.
As Hölmstrom and Milgrom (1987) show, it is optimal for the administrator to pay the
teacher based on the noisy output measure using a linear contract w = β0 + β1 q̂, where β1 is
the share of measured output paid to the teacher. Note that, from the teacher’s perspective,
uncertainty comes from the composite error νi + i , which we can collect as ηi . We can then
write the wage as w(a, η), where the administrator can only observe a + η. Ex-ante, teachers
face the same uncertainty about ηi .17
Substituting for output and output measure and using the result that the optimal contract
17

This section adopts the simplifying assumption that teachers treat ηi as being normally distributed when
solving for their optimal action. Technically, they should integrate over the distribution of distributions of i if
n(θ) is not constant. Simulation results confirm that ηi is approximately normally distributed for reasonable
parameter values; a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality of ηi has a p-value of 0.131. Further note that all
teachers would still have the same equilibrium action in the latter case, meaning this assumption would not
affect the qualitative predictions from this model. This assumption is, therefore, consistent with this model’s
focus on a hidden action, in contrast to the hidden type specification.
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will be linear in observed output, the administrator’s problem is
max Eν,η [a + ν − w(a, η)]

(10)

β0 ,β1

s.t. w(a, η) = β0 + β1 (a + η)


Eη −e−ξ(w(a,η)−ψ(a)) ≥ u


a ∈ arg max Eη −e−ξ(w(a,η)−ψ(a)) ,

(IR)
(IC)

where the individual rationality constraint (IR) ensures participation and the incentive compatibility constraint (IC) characterizes the teacher’s choice of action.
The teacher problem yields a unique optimal action a∗ = β1 /γ by differentiating (IC) with
respect to action and the optimal linear contract features β1∗ = 1/(1 + ξγση2 ) (see pp. 137139 of Bolton and Dewatripont (2005) for details).18 Therefore, expected output is E [q ∗ ] =

Eν [a∗ + ν] = a∗ = 1/ γ(1 + ξγση2 ) .19 Intuitively, as the signal quality worsens (i.e., ση2 increases) the contract becomes lower powered (i.e., β1∗ decreases), resulting in lower action a∗
and expected output E [q ∗ ].
As with the hidden type model, it is important to understand how choice of estimator would
affect output in this environment. The fixed effects estimator would simply be the unadulterated
output signal, i.e., q̂iF E = q̂i . Proposition 6 considers the case of constant class sizes.
Proposition 6. The administrator receives the same value from both estimators in Model HA
when class size is constant.
Proof. The empirical Bayes estimator would be q̂iF E shrunk by a constant factor λ, i.e., q̂iEB =
λq̂i . If (β0∗F E , β1∗F E ) solves (10) when using output measure q̂iF E then it must be that (β0∗F E , β1∗F E /λ)
solves (10) when using output measure λq̂i . Thus, the administrator obtains the same value
from using either estimator.
Intuitively, empirical Bayes contains the same ratio of signal to noise as fixed effects when
class sizes are constant, meaning the contract slope would simply adjust to take into account
its shrunken distribution. An implication of Proposition 6 is that we can scale the empirical
Bayes estimator in Model HA to have the same variance as the fixed effects estimator. That is,
we can compare estimator performance by scaling them to have the same variance and consider
only the information they contain.
18

Note that, according to this model, output will necessarily be zero when teachers are salaried (i.e., β1 = 0),
which is the case in many real-world applications in which, for various reasons, output-based pay has not been
implemented. This obviously counterfactual implication can be resolved by assuming there are two types of
effort: the action a which is only imperfectly measured and another action that is perfectly observed, and
therefore, contractible.
19
Note that, although in this moral hazard setting there is a degenerate distribution of teacher effort in
equilibrium, measured teacher quality (i.e., average test score q̂) is normally distributed.
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Model HA highlights the bias-variance “tradeoff” in a sense: if the variance of the fixed
effects estimator increased, the resulting optimal contract would partially protect a risk-averse
teacher by making incentives weaker in the output measure (i.e., test scores), or reducing the
slope of the linear contract β1 . The more risk-averse the teacher, the more protected they
would be (i.e., the shallower the slope β1 ). Crucially, the optimal contract would not respond
to an increase in noise by “changing the data” (e.g., switching to a lower-variance estimator),
but rather, would in equilibrium adjust the way in which the data is used in remuneration
(i.e., decrease β1 ). Indeed, Proposition 6 shows we can re-scale the empirical Bayes estimator
when class size is constant, suggesting the use of a biased, yet lower-variance estimator could
be modeled by increasing the effective error variance ση2 . What matters is the amount of
information about the action a in the output signal (Hölmstrom (1979)).
Therefore, as with the cutoff and hidden type models, the theoretical effect of switching
from empirical Bayes to fixed effects is unambiguous in the hidden action model, given the
relationship between class size and teacher quality: output would be the same with constant
class sizes, lower under empirical Bayes with a negative-quadratic n(θ), and higher under empirical Bayes when n(θ) is positive quadratic. As noted previously, Appendix E shows that the
administrator with a much more general objective would also prefer fixed effects over empirical
Bayes when n(θ) was negative quadratic and empirical Bayes when n(θ) was positive quadratic.

5

Quantitative Results

In this section, I quantify the estimators’ performance, using data from the Los Angeles Unified
School District, the second-largest school district in the US.20 In Section 5.1, I calibrate parameters needed to compare estimator performance in the cutoff model, which is most parsimonious.
In Section 5.2 I assume the administrator wishes to categorize all teachers in the district with
respect to an array of desired cutoffs in the district-wide distribution of teacher quality. Section
5.3 presents a back-of-the-envelope calculation of how choice of estimator would affect output
in the hidden type model. Section 5.4 presents a calibration of the additional parameters of
the hidden action model and computes how choice of estimator would affect output in that
environment. Although these incentive schemes are not currently in place in Los Angeles, these
exercises can serve as a useful benchmark for how the estimators might perform when used in
similar incentive schemes. Indeed, the fact that a high-stakes scheme was not in place obviates
addressing the potential strategic re-assignment of students to teachers.
20

Imberman and Lovenheim (2016) use these data in their study of the market’s valuation of value-added.
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5.1

Calibration

The cutoff model shows that the difference in the administrator’s value depends on the variances
of teacher quality σθ2 and the test score measurement error σ2 and the relationship between
teacher quality and class size, n(θ), implying that it is necessary to obtain values for these
objects to compare the performance of the estimators.
Variances Schochet and Chiang (2012) compile estimates of the variances from a large number of studies in their study of error rates in value-added models, providing a good source for
typical values for σθ2 and σ2 (see Appendix D.1). The chosen parameter values of σθ2 = 0.046
and σ2 = 0.953 indicate that the variance of the measurement error is about 20 times the size
of the variance of teacher quality, resulting in an average student-achievement signal-to-noise
ratio of 0.512; that is, student achievement for the average teacher in Los Angeles is about equal
parts signal and noise. This value is similar to the one used in Staiger and Rockoff (2010). As
has been noted by many other researchers studying a wide variety of contexts (e.g., McCaffrey
et al. (2009), Staiger and Rockoff (2010)), it is difficult to correctly classify teachers.
Relationship Between Class Size and Teacher Quality I recover the relationship between class size and teacher quality using value-added estimates provided by the Los Angeles
Times. In 2011, the Los Angeles Times published the results of a RAND Corporation study estimating value-added for over 30,000 teachers serving almost 700,000 students (Buddin (2011)).21
The dataset contains estimated value-added, estimating using fixed-effects models, for 3rd to
5th grade teachers in both Reading and Math and class sizes which condition on several variables, including past performance of students, class size, student characteristics such as race,
gender, English proficiency and parents education, and classroom composition (past performance of classmates and their student characteristics as well).22 In addition to describing the
relationship between teacher quality and class size, which is critical to compare the performance
of the estimators, the distributions of value-added estimates from Buddin (2011) are similar to
those in Schochet and Chiang (2012).23 The average class size is 22.5 students, with a standard
deviation of 5 students.
Figure 4 plots non-parametric regressions (solid blue lines) of class size on estimated teacher
value-added for Reading (4a) and Math (4b). Teachers at either end of the distribution of
21

http://projects.latimes.com/value-added/
The results do not appreciably change when using value-added estimates from specifications that control
for subsets of these characteristics.
23
The distributions of value-added in the data have means of 6.4E-11 and 1.3E-10 and variances of 0.038
and 0.083 for Reading and Math value-added, respectively. Because the quantitative results combine data from
Buddin (2011) and parameter values calibrated from other datasets, the fact that these parameters are similar
across the two types of sources lends validity to the quantitative results.
22
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Figure 4: The relationship between class size and teacher quality
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Reading value-added have the smallest class sizes and those in the middle of the distribution
have the largest class sizes. Table 1 shows the results of regressions of teacher class size on
estimated teacher quality and estimated teacher quality squared. The first two columns are
for Reading and the second two are for Math. The dotted black lines on Figure 4 shows the
regression line fit for models in columns (1) and (3). Columns (2) and (4) are the same as
regressions in (1) and (3), respectively, but exclude teachers whose estimated quality is more
than two standard deviations from the population mean, showing that the estimates from the
full sample are not driven by outliers. These results indicate that class size is indeed increasing
in value-added in the lowest part of the distribution and decreasing in value-added in the
highest part of the distribution. The relationship is not as clear for math value-added, but the
regression shows that class size first increases and then decreases for reading value-added, with
a negative quadratic term for math value-added. Strikingly, the observed relationship between
teacher quality and class size is the worst-case scenario for the empirical Bayes estimator, as
outlined by Proposition 2.
To most closely match the model, n(θ) would ideally be known and fed into the administrator’s problem. In practice, only estimates of n(θ), denoted by n̂(θ̂), are directly available from
any dataset; the latter are what was presented in Table 1. The estimated relationship n̂(θ̂) also
features a mechanical negative-quadratic relationship, caused by heteroskedastic errors possible
even under identically distributed class sizes. To address these issues, I calibrate n(θ) using
an indirect inference approach described in Appendix D.2. Table 2 presents the calibrated
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Table 1: Regressions of class size on teacher quality
Dependent variable: Class size
Reading
quality
Sq. Reading
quality

(1)

(2)

0.618∗∗∗
(0.139)

0.650∗∗∗
(0.167)

−6.801∗∗∗
(0.368)

−11.180∗∗∗
(0.834)

Math
quality
Sq. Math
quality
Constant

Observations
R2
F Statistic
Note:

∗∗∗

(3)

(4)

0.060
(0.092)

−0.008
(0.109)

−1.014∗∗∗
(0.212)

−1.527∗∗∗
(0.370)

22.609∗∗∗
(0.030)

22.736∗∗∗
(0.035)

22.434∗∗∗
(0.032)

22.467∗∗∗
(0.035)

36,125
0.009
170.442∗∗∗
(df = 2; 36122)

34,407
0.006
99.271∗∗∗
(df = 2; 34404)

36,125
0.001
11.442∗∗∗
(df = 2; 36122)

34,372
0.0005
8.535∗∗∗
(df = 2; 34369)

p<0.01

relationships between teacher quality and class size, n(θ), which are used for the quantitative
results. The first column presents the intercept, the second the linear term, and the third the
term on the quadratic variable. The negative quadratic term in the calibrated relationship
between class size and teacher quality for Reading is stronger than that presented in Table
1, at -13.929, compared to -6.801 in column (1) of Table 1. On the other hand, there is a
negligible relationship between class size and teacher quality in Math. That is, the mechanical
relationship generated by heteroskedasticity can basically explain the fairly weak pattern in
Table 1.
Table 2: Calibrated n(θ), by subject
Subject
Reading
Math

Constant
22.702
22.263

Subject quality
1.031
-0.225

Sq. subject quality
-13.929
-0.039

Note: Calibration details are in Appendix D.2.
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Res. Std. Error
5.124
4.388

5.2

Quantitative Findings: Cutoff Model

This section computes the administrator’s value from using each estimator for a wide range of
desired cutoffs, using the calibrated values of error variances and the relationship between class
size and teacher quality obtained in Section 5.1. For each desired cutoff κ and subject (e.g.,
identifying teachers with quality at or above the 99th percentile for Reading value added), I solve
for the administrator’s optimal cutoff policy for fixed-effects and empirical Bayes estimators,
assuming a symmetric loss function.24 This returns an expected objective for each estimator,
FE
EB
for each desired cutoff (and subject), i.e., vCP
(κ) and vCP
(κ) for the fixed-effects and empirical
Bayes estimators, respectively (for Reading).
Figure 5a plots the ratio of the administrator’s maximized expected objective under the fixed
FE
EB
effects and empirical Bayes estimators (vCP
(κ)/vCP
(κ)) for Reading (solid black line) and Math
(dotted red line), for desired cutoffs ranging from the lowest to the highest teacher qualities. The
right panel (5b) plots how many more expected mistakes the empirical Bayes estimator would
make than the fixed effects estimator, assuming the Los Angeles school district employed 30,000
teachers.25 We can see that the quadratic nature of the association between teacher quality and
class size affects the relative performance of the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators in
the way demonstrated by Proposition 2. The stronger negative-quadratic relationship between
teacher quality and class size in the Reading test causes the larger divergence between the value
of using fixed effects rather than empirical Bayes estimators. The administrator’s value is higher
almost everywhere when she uses the fixed effects estimator, and the relative performance of the
empirical Bayes estimator is the worst at the extremes of the distribution of teacher quality. For
example, using fixed effects would increase the administrator’s value by 2%, corresponding to the
empirical Bayes estimator making almost 800 more mistakes than fixed effects when the desired
cutoff is at the 1st percentile, and 600 more when the desired cutoff is at the 99th percentile. Put
another way, even when the administrator is allowed to re-optimize and choose an estimatorspecific cutoff policy, using empirical Bayes would result in 9.5% more classification mistakes
when the desired cutoff was at the 1st percentile of teacher quality and 7.3% more mistakes
when the desired cutoff was the 99th percentile of teacher quality.26 The administrator’s values
from using the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators become comparable as the desired
cutoff approaches the center of the distribution of teacher quality. In sum, the performance of
the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators most greatly diverges precisely where policies
that sanction very low-performing teachers or reward very high-performing teachers would bite
24

Results are qualitatively similar under asymmetric preferences, i.e., where α 6= 1/2; see Appendix B.3.
The Los Angeles school district is the second-largest in the US. Though the value-added data I am using
cover 30,000 teachers, more than 45,000 worked in the district in 2007 (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Los_
Angeles_Unified_School_District).
26
The fraction of classification mistakes when using fixed effects when the desired cutoff κ is the 1st and 99th
percentile would be 27.8% and 27.1%, respectively.
25
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the most, and the fixed effects estimator returns higher expected maximized utility (i.e., in
expectation would make fewer mistakes) under almost every desired cutoff.
Figure 5: Administrator’s value and difference in mistakes, using calibrated n(θ)
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The divergence in estimator performance is largest when the desired cutoff is in the tails
of true teacher quality. However, all teachers would be affected by the administrator’s choice
of estimator. Figure 6a plots the probability that a teacher with true quality θ, measured
along the x-axis, has an estimated quality θ̂ above the optimal cutoff policy corresponding
to a desired cutoff κ of the first percentile of true teacher quality (dotted black line), e.g.,
Pr{θ̂F E ≥ c∗F E } for the fixed effects estimator. This desired cutoff could correspond to firing
teachers with quality at or below the first percentile. These probabilities are plotted for the fixed
effects (solid red line) and empirical Bayes (dashed blue line) estimators, using the relationship
between class size and teacher quality for Reading. The shaded area corresponds to teachers
with true quality below the desired cutoff. Having an estimated quality above c∗ for teachers
in this region would mean the administrator made a Type II error, e.g., they were incorrectly
retained, the probability of which corresponds to the distance from the estimator-specific curve
to 1 in Figure 6a. For teachers outside the shaded region, having an estimated quality below
c∗ would correspond to a Type I error, e.g., they were incorrectly dismissed, the probability of
which corresponds to the height of the estimator-specific curve.
For each estimator, the probability of having estimated quality above the optimal cutoff
policy increases as a teacher’s true quality increases (i.e., we move to the right). However,
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the fixed effects estimator has a higher probability of measuring above-threshold teachers as
above c∗F E than does empirical Bayes for its corresponding optimal cutoff policy and a lower
probability of measuring below-threshold teachers as above c∗F E . That is, fixed effects would
have lower probabilities of both Type I and Type II errors. This is more clear in Figure
6b, which plots the ratio of probability of the estimate being above the respective cutoff for
fixed effects over empirical Bayes, i.e., Pr{θ̂F E ≥ c∗F E }/ Pr{θ̂EB ≥ c∗EB }. For example, fixed
effects would have a 40% lower chance of measuring a teacher with true quality more than
four standard deviations below the mean (θ ≈ −0.8)—well below the desired cutoff quality of
the first percentile—as above the optimal cutoff policy and a 10% higher chance of finding a
teacher with true quality about 1.5 sd below the mean (θ ≈ −0.3)—above the desired cutoff
quality—as above the cutoff policy. More generally, teachers over a large range of quality would
be differentially affected by the estimator—that is, the impacts are not limited only to those in
the extreme tails of the quality distribution.
Figure 6: Probability of being measured above optimal cutoff policy, given F −1 (κ) = 0.01
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Quantitative Findings: Hidden Type Model

Although the cutoff-based model has an intuitive outcome space—the probability of correct
classification—it would also be of interest to gauge how choice of estimator would affect output.
We can also use the calibrated relationship between teacher quality and class size to form a

32

rough idea of how moving to an output-based retention policy would affect outcomes if we had
information about the replacement cost χ.
As a rough approximation I use the two-period Model HT-2 to get an idea for how much
the choice of estimator affects output. I computed output under Model HT-2 (i.e., HT-0
with nonconstant n(θ)) under fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators using the calibrated
Reading class size relationship from Table 2 and a calibrated replacement cost value of χ =
0.25σθ = 0.054. I chose this value for χ because Wiswall (2013) reports that teachers with 30
years of experience have value-added that is one standard deviation higher than new teachers
and 0.75 standard deviations higher than teachers with five years of experience, implying a 0.25
standard deviation difference acquired in the first five years of experience. This value is similar
to that used in Staiger and Rockoff (2010), who assume a first-year teacher has an average value
added 0.07 sd lower than teachers with two or more years of experience. Note that, by setting
χ in terms of standard deviations of teacher quality, the outcome is then naturally viewed in
terms of teacher quality.
Expected output when using empirical Bayes and the optimal reservation signal policy
q ∗EB (χ, n(θ)), is 0.058. That is, second-period teacher quality from using empirical Bayes
would be 5.8% of a standard deviation higher than it would be in a world where all teachers
were retained. Expected teacher quality, and hence, output, from using fixed effects would be
0.11% higher. If instead, we used the value χ = 0.07 from Staiger and Rockoff (2010), expected
teacher quality in the second period would be 0.22% higher under fixed effects than when using
empirical Bayes. Either way, even though they are only based on a rough example, these results
suggest there is potentially a considerable benefit from using fixed effects instead of empirical
Bayes to measure teacher quality.

5.4

Quantitative Illustration: Hidden Action Model

As with the hidden type environment, it would be useful to get even a rough sense of how
measurement issues affect output in the real world in a hidden action environment, by using a
tractable model and realistic values for model parameters, including the relationship between
class size and teacher quality. The simplicity of the hidden action model affords an ancillary
contribution. If the model can be calibrated then, not only can I compute how the choice
of estimator would affect output, but I can also provide a rough sense of what the optimal
contract should look like in this environment, using the calibrated parameter values. This,
then, comprises an additional contribution of the current paper.
Therefore, this section takes two approaches to roughly examine how introducing outputbased wages and choice of estimator, might affect educational production. First, it uses estimates from Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) to calibrate parameters from the hidden
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action model. Second it computes the effect on output from using either estimator of teacher
quality for a wide range of model primitives. The approaches use the relationship between class
size and teacher quality for Reading, from Section 5.1.27 and yield similar findings regarding
the increase in output coming from the administrator’s use of fixed effects, instead of empirical
Bayes. Note that, in each approach, actions and output are measured relative to their baseline
level, i.e., that provided by teachers in the absence of output-based incentives.
In the hidden action model, output is a function of the action, which itself depends on the
variance of noise η, CARA parameter ξ, and cost parameter γ. I first characterize how much
information the administrator can extract about teacher quality (here, teacher effort choices)
using either estimator. I do this by calibrating the implied variance of the composite error η for
the fixed effects and empirical Bayes estimators (see Appendix D.3 for details).28 As was the
case with a cutoff-based rule, the empirical Bayes estimator makes it more difficult to separate
high- and low-performing teachers when the class size function is negative quadratic. This can
be modeled as increasing the measurement error variance on teacher action, ση2 , by 3.2%.29 The
next section shows how to obtain a baseline value of ση2 , that is, the value of ση2 under fixed
effects, which is required to solve the model.
Calibration Based on Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) With the above assessment of how using empirical Bayes would affect measurement of output in the hidden action
model, we can obtain some rough guidance from research in this area by calibrating the hidden
action model using a “sophisticated” back-of-the-envelope method and data from an experimental teacher incentive pay scheme. I use the term “sophisticated” because I calibrate using
equilibrium implications of the hidden action model. The objective is to use data from the
study and other information as needed, to calibrate the model parameters (γ, ξ, ση2 ). With
these in hand, then it is possible to characterize the optimal contract and the effect of using the
empirical Bayes estimator on equilibrium output under this optimal contract. As I show below,
values for ξ and ση2 can be obtained either directly from external sources or by transforming
external data. However, to calibrate the effort cost parameter γ we need to know how much
teachers respond to incentive pay.
Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011) estimate the effect of an output-based incentive
scheme for teachers in the Indian state of Andhra Pradesh, in which teachers were paid according
to a linear schedule, 500 rupees per percent increase in mean test scores, for test score gains
27

The negligible relationship between teacher quality and class size for Math (see Table 2), when combined
with Proposition 6, obviates having to solve the model to compare estimator performance.
28
This exercise abstracts from the error introduced by class size uncertainty. As is shown below, this would
understate the gain in output from using fixed effects instead of empirical Bayes.
29
Of course, it would be in principle possible to also directly condition on class size. However, as has been
discussed previously, this would introduce a direct incentive to manipulate class size to affect the administrator’s
posterior beliefs about teacher quality.
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above 5%. The study covered two years. Of course, it would be ideal to use a study of
an incentive pay program in Los Angeles, or even the US. Unfortunately, to my knowledge,
none exist which provide a comparably close map to the environment developed in Model HA.
Moreover, as with any mapping between theory and data, assumptions have to be made. For
example, teachers are assumed to be paid a share of the amount of income generated (“output”)
by their action. However, we can still learn something from this exercise. First, note that CARA
utility implies that risk aversion is independent of wealth, meaning the large differences in wealth
between teachers in India and the US may not affect teacher actions/output (wealth differences
would only affect the intercept in the contract β0 , via the outside option). Therefore, though I
calibrate remaining parameters as if the setting were the teachers in Andhra Pradesh and the
relationship between class size and teacher quality were the calibrated one based on LAUSD
Reading data, there is reason to believe the results may also be informative about output in
this paper’s context of the US.30 Second, the linear scheme employed in Muralidharan and
Sundararaman (2011) allows me to cleanly map their findings to the hidden action model,
as does their experimental research design, which obviates having to account for differences
in output between treatment and control groups being based on selection on hidden types.
Although the context is India, I convert currency into US dollars for convenience.
There were on average 3.14 teachers and 37.5 pupils per teacher in the incentive schools.
Students’ annual wages increased by an average of 2,156 rupees per student31 and the average
cost of the incentive scheme was 20,000 rupees.32 Assuming that none of this amount went
to administering the program and a conversion rate of 45 rupees per dollar, this corresponds
to $1,796.67 (=$47.91×37.5) in total output produced by the average teacher and $141.54
(=$444.44/3.14) paid to the average teacher. Then, the slope of the contract is the per-teacher
income increase ($141.54) divided by the increase in output ($1,796.67), or 0.0788; i.e., teachers
are paid a piece rate of 7.88% of output.
There is no particular reason to assume that the incentive pay schedule in this experiment
was optimal. However, note that we can exploit the teacher’s optimal choice of action, which
solves (IC) in (10) but does not rely on optimality of the slope β1 , to map (β1 , a) to the cost
γ. The value of γ which rationalizes this increase is then γ = β1 /a = 0.0788/1, 796.67 =
4.385 × 10−5 . Nadler and Wiswall (2011) provide evidence that teacher risk aversion matters
for how incentives are structured. I set the CARA parameter to ξ = 6.7 × 10−3 , the mean
estimated CARA from the benchmark model of Cohen and Einav (2007), Table 5.
Finally, the variance of output, which is relevant for the teacher’s actions, depends on the
conversion from test scores to output and the variance of test scores. Suppose mean test scores y
30

Results are similar if I instead use the mean class size in the LA data.
See footnote 34 on page 72 of Muralidharan and Sundararaman (2011).
32
The incentive scheme cost an average of 10,000 rupees for each of two years.
31
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were converted to observed output via q̂ = βq y. Then the conversion factor βq can be calibrated
by noting that the scheme increased test scores by 0.15 sd and output per teacher by $1,796.67,
giving a conversion $11,977.78 (=$1,796.67/0.15). The variance of test score signal can be
computed by dividing the baseline variance of test score measurement error σ2 , from Section
5.1, by the mean number of students per teacher in the data, i.e., 0.953/(37.5). To obtain the
variance of income ση2 we then square the test-score-to-income parameter and multiply by the
variance of mean test score, i.e., ση2 =6,076,631$2 (=$11,977.782 × 0.953/(37.5)).33
Having obtained the calibrated parameter values above, we can now solve for the optimal
slope of β1∗F E = 0.483 and a corresponding optimal action of a∗F E = $11, 011.34, which corresponds to an average increase in student achievement of 0.919 sd. This increase is 6 times larger
than the estimated increase in student achievement stemming from the much weaker incentives
provided under the experiment. In contrast, using the earlier reckoning that empirical Bayes
increases the variance of η by 3.2%, using empirical Bayes would produce an optimal slope of
β1∗EB = 0.475 and optimal action of a∗EB = $10, 832.07, i.e., a 0.904 sd average increase in student achievement. As expected, the higher measurement error variance on output from using
empirical Bayes would lower the strength of incentives (i.e., slope) and resulting equilibrium
action. Output would be 1.65% higher under fixed effects than it would be under empirical
Bayes, suggesting an obvious choice of fixed effects for education policymakers. Naturally, we
would expect the results from the hidden type model to be smaller than those from hidden
action model here, as the hidden type model primarily affects output at the low end of the
teacher quality distribution, while the hidden action model effects output for all teachers.
Sensitivity Analysis Via Parameter Grid The mean class size in the Los Angeles data is
22.5, much smaller than the mean of 37.5 used in the above calibration. Smaller class sizes would
increase the variance of the output measure. Moreover, Dohmen and Falk (2010) document
that teachers are more risk-averse than other workers. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to
examine how output would be affected by varying the parameters of the hidden action model.
Figure 7 presents contour maps of model outcomes for a grid of points covering a wide range of
alternative values of ση2 and ξ, ranging from one half to ten times the calibrated value of each
parameter.34 Note that, because γ was recovered using the teacher’s optimal action choice and
can be recovered by using the slope of incentives in the experiment and increase in output, it
33

This is because the variance of q̂, i.e., ση2 , is βq2 σy2 . Alternatively, the calibration could be in terms of test
scores by scaling the CARA parameter by the increase in output per sd increase in mean test score, returning
ξy = 6.7 × 10−3 × 11, 977.78 = 80.25. Then, using the slope of β1 = 0.0788 and output increase of 0.15 sd,
2
we can compute γy = 0.0788/0.15 = 0.525. Then, setting the variance of η equal to ση,y
= σ2 /37.5 we obtain
exactly the same optimal slope and action as when units are denominated in dollars.
34
Table 2 in Babcock et al. (1993) shows that a higher-end estimate of ξ is about 0.35, well above the range
considered in the parameter grid here. The output loss from using empirical Bayes would be larger for CARA
parameters in that range.
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does not depend on (ση2 , ξ) and is therefore fixed. Figure 7a is a contour map of the optimal
output share when using fixed effects, or β1∗F E . Figure 7b is a contour map of optimal output


when using fixed effects, i.e., E q ∗F E . In both figures, the value corresponding to the calibrated
values of ση2 and ξ is indicated by a red dot. We can see that as teachers become more risk
averse (increasing ξ) or the output measure becomes noisier (increasing ση2 ), both incentive
strength (Figure 7a) and output decrease (Figure 7b). For example, the increase in output
ranges from over 3 sd in student achievement to around 0.5 sd when teachers are ten times
more risk averse than their calibrated value of ξ = 6.7e − 3; this latter figure is only about
three times the estimated effect of the incentive scheme. Figure 7c is a contour map of the
expected share of teacher income comprised by variable compensation when using fixed effects,




i.e., E β1∗F E q ∗F E / E β0∗F E + β1∗F E q ∗F E . As with the slope and output, this share declines as
the output noise variance and degree of risk aversion increase.35 The optimal expected share
of income that is variable pay under the calibrated parameter values would be around 7%.
As interesting as these results are in their own right, the goal in this section is to quantify
the difference in output stemming from using one estimator versus another. Figure 7d shows
the ratio in optimal output from using fixed effects over that using empirical Bayes. We can see
here that, although optimal incentive strength and output gains vary quite a bit (in ways we
would naturally expect) with respect to ση2 and ξ, the output gain associated with using fixed
effects versus empirical Bayes ranges from a little more than 1% to around 3%. Intuitively,
the higher noise in empirical Bayes matters more (relative to the cost γ) when teachers are
more risk averse or when the baseline variance on the shock to output is higher. Of course,
we cannot know the exact amount by which the output would be lower were the administrator
to use empirical Bayes; knowing this would require the development and estimation of a richer
and more realistic structural model. However, the variable share of compensation in Figure
7c can provide further of guidance for, say, a reader skeptical of the calibrated values of ση2
and ξ. Suppose it seemed reasonable that, in the optimal arrangement, the variable share of
compensation for teachers would be at most around 2% of their income; this would correspond
to the upper-right triangle of Figure 7c. Then the gain in output from switching from empirical
Bayes to fixed effects would be about 2-3%, which is even larger than it was at the calibrated
parameter values.

6

Discussion

While economic theory can help inform education policy, measurement issues are also important when considering how to use data in actual educational policies. Possibly because they
35

This was computed using a certainty equivalent value of $70,000, which is in the realm of teacher incomes;
see Himes (2015).
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Figure 7: Optimal output share and ratio of output for (ση2 , ξ)−grid
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-3.0

minimize mean squared error, empirical Bayes estimators of teacher value-added are used by
many education researchers and practitioners to make inferences about teacher quality, which
may serve as inputs to high-stakes decisions like bonus assignments, personnel decisions, or
even overall wages. It is not obvious this should be the case.
In this paper, I show that the preferred estimator depends on information that is plausibly
part of an administrator’s context. The preferred estimator would be the same for wide ranges
of underlying parameters for all the models considered and only depends on the relationship
between class size and teacher quality. I find that class size is negative quadratic with respect
to teacher quality in the Los Angeles Unified School District, the second-largest district in the
United States. At the lowest and highest percentiles of desired quality, an administrator using
empirical Bayes would respectively make 10% or 7% more classification mistakes than the fixed
effects estimator when classifying Los Angeles teachers based on their students’ Reading test
scores. Using fixed effects instead of empirical Bayes would increase output by 1.65% in the
hidden action model and by between 0.11%-0.22% in the hidden type model.
Suppose an administrator had been using empirical Bayes in an incentive scheme. Would
it make sense to switch to fixed effects? Of course, the relevant comparison in any economic
context is a cost-benefit one. It is important to note that the intervention considered in this
paper is very easy to implement and virtually costless—to use a different, more transparent
estimator of teacher quality—and that the preferred estimator would be the same across several
models of the administrator’s objective. Indeed, in all likelihood, the cost of switching to fixed
effects is virtually zero, or even negative, given the increased transparency of fixed effects, which
may translate to a lower nonpecuniary cost incurred by society. Then, by an economic criterion,
these results suggest an obvious benefit from using fixed effects instead of empirical Bayes in
the design of teacher incentive schemes if, as was suggested previously, class size is negative
quadratic in teacher quality in the relevant context. Moreover, the finding of this paper—that
measurement of teacher quality may affect the performance of teacher incentive schemes—
could in principle be applied to findings from other work in this area, or work studying how to
structure incentives and personnel decisions, based on noisy output measures.
Motivated by the quantitative results showing the choice of estimator can create differences
in policy-relevant outcomes, I have reviewed existing incentive schemes, which are summarized
in Appendix A. Most of the schemes use cutoff rules to assign bonuses and more than half
base bonuses, in part, on value-added models of student achievement. Almost 90% of the
latter use empirical Bayes estimators to calculate teacher quality. Strikingly, about one-fifth
of the schemes do not even specify how student achievement is mapped into teacher bonuses.
A corollary of this paper’s results is that, because the choice of estimator matters, teacher
incentive programs should clearly specify exactly how student achievement enters them.
This paper characterizes which estimator would be preferred by an administrator in an
39

extremely large school district that has recently received much policy interest (such as that
created by the Los Angeles Times release of the value-added estimates used here). A study
of how best to estimate teacher quality for another context would require data from the relevant geography and, to prescribe the optimal policy, information about the administrator’s
preferences. However, the uniform nature of the preferred estimator across the variety of environments studied in this paper suggests that a policymaker in another district could choose
the right estimator for their context with a certain degree of confidence. Important future work
would study optimal design of incentive schemes using a more general production technology
model relating economic output to teacher quality, such as one allowing for cumulative effects of
inputs in a dynamic setting. Other important future work could estimate models of assignment
of students to teachers.
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Appendix
A

Teacher Incentive Schemes

Table 3 documents existing teacher incentive schemes that are based, at least in part, on student
achievement. Many of these schemes include estimates of value-added as a determinant of
teacher bonuses, and most that do base bonuses on value-added also include other measures of
teacher quality.
Table 3: Incentive pay schemes
Name of scheme
Dallas Independent School
District (DISD) Principal
and Teacher Incentive Pay
program

Location
Dallas, Texas

TVAAS
Tennessee Educator Acceleration Model (TEAM)
Memphis’ Teacher Effectiveness Measure (TEM)
Pennsylvania

Tennessee
Tennessee

Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes

Discrete

Yes

Yes

Discrete

Yes

Yes

Guilford
County,
North Carolina
Nationwide
(125
schools in 9 states
and 50 districts as of
2007)
Denver, Colorado

Discrete

Yes

Yes

Discrete

Yes

Yes

2006-current

Discrete

Yes

Yes

Since 1999

Discrete

Yes

Varies

Since 2005

Discrete (many bonus
levels)

No

No

Florida

2006-2007
(MAP
since
2007)

Discrete (MAP has
both continuous and
discrete rewards)

No

North Carolina
Minnesota

1996-2012
Since 2005

Discrete
Varies,
but
discrete

Since 2010
2008
school
year

Discrete
?

No (though they do use
a discretized version of
value-added
through
a
value table)
No
Varies between participants, but unknown in
general.
?
?

Louisiana
Louisiana
Texas’ Governor’s EducaTexas
tor Excellence Award Programs (GEEAP)
Source: Author’s compilation.

B.1

Discrete
Discrete

Since 2010

Pittsburgh

B

Uses EB?
Yes

Since
20132014
Since
20132014
since 2012-2013

North Carolina

North Carolina ABCs
Q-Comp

Uses value-added ?
Yes

Pennsylvania

North Carolina Teacher
Evaluation Process
Mission Possible

Denver Public School’s
Professional
Compensation System for Teachers
(ProComp)
Special Teachers Are Rewarded (STAR) (followed
by MAP)

Bonus schedule
Discrete

Memphis, Tennessee

Pittsburgh

Milken Family Foundation’s Teacher Advancement Program (TAP)

Active dates
2007-08 school
year
(Previous
program
started
in
1992)
Since 1996
Since 2010

mostly

No
?

?
?

Cutoff Model Proofs and Extensions
Direct Conditioning on Class Size

The difference in administrator’s value from using different teacher-quality estimators derives
from the assumption that the administrator chooses a cutoff policy based on only test score information. Such a one-dimensional policy is quite simple and, therefore, is of considerable clear
policy relevance; this demonstrated by Table 3, which documents existing incentive pay programs and shows that none condition on class size, among incentivized teachers. Additionally,
41

when compared with a policy that may also explicitly condition on class sizes, a test-score-based
cutoff may attenuate issues of class size manipulation for the sake of affecting the administrator’s posterior about the quality of a particular teacher. However, allowing the administrator
to explicitly take into account class size is of theoretical interest. Therefore, this section shows
how the theoretical results in Section 3 would be affected.
Now suppose the administrator, instead of only indirectly taking it into account when maximizing her utility, could instead explicitly condition on class size ni . If ni was a strictly
monotonic function of teacher quality θ then the administrator could achieve a perfect classification of teachers by inverting n(θ)—even if she ignored all teachers’ test scores. A more
realistic case is where there are multiple teacher qualities for at least one class size. Suppose
that the distribution of teacher qualities for each class size is normally distributed. Note that,
because she can explicitly condition on class size, she can hold a separate cutoff-based classification problem for each class size level; denote the administrator’s value from using the fixed
FE
EB
effects and empirical Bayes estimators as vCP,n
(κ) and vCP,n
(κ), respectively. Then by Proposition 1 the administrator would obtain the same value for either estimator given the desired
EB
FE
(κ) for all (n, κ). Therefore, we can without loss of generality
(κ) = vCP,n
cutoff κ, i.e., vCP,n
E
. Further note that
consider only the fixed-effects estimator, with optimal cutoff policy c∗F
n
the administrator’s expected objective would be at least as high if she is allowed to split her
E
E
original objective into one objective for each class size; if the cutoff for c∗F
= c∗F
for all class
n1
n2
sizes n1 , n2 , then her value under the separate class size scheme is the same as that from her
original objective.

B.2

Administrator’s Problem with Infinite Precision

We want to prove that as the variance of the measurement error tends to 0 (which implies
FE
EB
(κ) = vCP
(κ) = 1 for all desired κ.
σ → 0) all teachers will be correctly categorized, giving vCP
First, consider the fixed effects estimator. The administrator’s utility for a teacher with true
quality θ under estimator θ̂ and cutoff policy c is
uCP (θ, θ̂; c, κ) = α1{θ̂ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ} + (1 − α)1{θ̂ < c ∩ θ < κ}

p

→ α1{θ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ} + (1 − α)1{θ < c ∩ θ < κ},
(11)

which is maximized at c = κ. The administrator’s utility from using empirical Bayes estimator
for the same teacher is
plimσ →0 uCP (θ, θ̂; c, κ) = α1{θ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ} + (1 − α)1{θ < c ∩ θ < κ}
= α1{λ(θ)θ ≥ c ∩ θ ≥ κ} + (1 − α)1{λ(θ)θ < c ∩ θ < κ},
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(12)

which is maximized at c = κ/λ(F −1 (κ)). The probabilities of the events in both (11) and (12)
are all 1, giving an expected utility of 1 for all teacher qualities, which then integrates to a
value of 1 for each estimator.

B.3

Asymmetric Type I and Type II Weights

The main analysis assumed the administrator equally weighed Type I and II errors, i.e., α = 1/2.
However, the administrator’s preferred estimator is not sensitive to this assumption. Figure 8
plots the ratio of the administrator’s value under fixed effects and empirical Bayes, by class
size scenario n(θ) and desired cutoff κ, for different values of the Type I error weight. Figure
8a shows the ratio in administrator’s value when α = 1/4, or the administrator values Type I
errors one-third as much as she values Type II errors. Figure 8b shows the same ratio for when
α = 2/3, i.e., the administrator values Type I errors twice as much as Type II errors. In both
plots, we can see that the relative ranking of the estimators is the same as it was under the
symmetric weight, α = 1/2, scenario.
Figure 8: Difference between administrator’s value under fixed effects and empirical Bayes, by
class size scenario and desired cut point and weight on Type I error, α
F E (κ)/v EB (κ) when α = 2/3
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0.8

1.0

B.4

Proposition 7

This section proves that fixed effects and empirical Bayes return the same value when the
administrator’s problem is symmetric.
Definition 1. The administrator’s problem is symmetric if α = 1/2, n(θ) is symmetric around
the population mean of teacher quality, and the administrator’s desired cutoff is κ = 0.
Proposition 7. The administrator receives the same value from both estimators when the
problem is symmetric.
Proof. Because n(θ) is symmetric about θ = 0 and θi ∼ F = N (0, σθ2 ), the distribution of θ is
symmetric around its population mean of 0. The optimal c∗EB solves
∞

Z
0

1
φ
λ(n(θ))σ (n(θ))



c∗EB /λ(n(θ)) − θ
σ (n(θ))



Z

0

φ(θ/σθ )dθ =
−∞

1
φ
λ(n(θ))σ (n(θ))



c∗EB /λ(n(θ)) − θ
σ (n(θ))


φ(θ/σθ )dθ.

At c∗EB = 0, the expression becomes
Z

∞

0

1
φ
λ(n(θ))σ (n(θ))



−θ
σ (n(θ))



Z

0

φ(θ/σθ )dθ =
−∞

1
φ
λ(n(θ))σ (n(θ))



−θ
σ (n(θ))


φ(θ/σθ )dθ,

which holds because of the symmetry of φ(·), n(·), and λ(·) (through its dependence on n,
which is symmetric). Therefore, c∗EB = 0 solves the administrator’s problem when empirical
Bayes is used. Because λ(n(θ)) = 1, ∀θ when the fixed effects estimator is used, c∗F E = 0 must
also solve the administrator’s problem when fixed effects is used, meaning the administrator’s
objective is equivalent under both estimators.

C
C.1

Extensions to Hidden Type Model HT-0
Model HT-1

Now allow T > 2 and let output depend on teacher experience xi(j,t),t according to qjit =
β0 + θi(j,t) + e(xi(j,t),t ), where e(xit ) represents output, net of β0 and teacher quality, for a
teacher with t − 1 periods of prior experience.
The optimal hiring policy ψh is unchanged. Consider the retention decision for teachers in
period t = T , for teachers with the same experience, xit = xt . Such a policy need not only apply
to teachers’ first years of experience; Wiswall (2013) shows that teacher quality also changes
after the first few years of experience. Let q̂Hit be the sample mean of teacher i’s output signals
realized before period t. The retention decision ψr still has a reservation value property, which
now depends on the mean of each teacher’s
 entire
 history of signals, q̂Hit , 2where the threshold
χ+e(xt )
σ
now depends on the period, i.e., q t = µ −
, where ρt = σθ2 /(σθ2 + n|H
). The reservation
ρt
t|
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signal q t is decreasing in xt if there are productivity gains to experience and increasing in ρt ,
due to the higher precision about teachers’ true quality. Note that solution to this problem
would be the same as that from HT-0, setting the replacement cost (in HT-0) to χt ≡ χ + e(xt )
and using the relevant ρt . Also, note that considering instead periods t < T would change the
desired threshold quality, which could be modeled by suitably adjusting the replacement cost
χ from the static model HT-0. Therefore, this sequence of per-period reservation signals can
then be mapped to the cutoff-based model via a sequence of cutoff-based problems, one for each
period of experience, as was done for Model HT-0. Finally, note that a similar transformation
to the one above could be performed to adapt Model HT-2 (see Section C.2) to also allow for
an effect of experience on output.

C.2

Model HT-2

This model augments HT-0 to allow class size to depend on teacher quality, i.e., ni = n(θ).
As in HT-0, consider the administrator’s problem in the second period. As in the cutoff
model, the administrator must now integrate over the distribution of class sizes when choosing
their reservation signal, meaning (8) must be adapted to obtain the administrator’s value from
using fixed effects:
∞

Z

FE
vHT
2 (χ) = max

Φ

qF E

−∞

Z

qF E − θ
σ (n(θ))

!
dF (θ) (−χ)

FE

∞

q −θ
σ (n(θ))

1−Φ

+

!

−∞



φ −q F E /σθ̂F E (n(θ))

  dF (θ), (13)

σθ̂F E (n(θ)) Φ −q F E /σ F E
θ̂
(n(θ))

!! 

σθ2

p
where σθ̂F E (n(θ)) = σθ2 + σ2 /n(θ) and σ (n(θ)) is as defined on page 11. The administrator’s
value from using the empirical Bayes estimator is
EB
vHT
2 (χ) = max

∞

Z

Φ

q EB

−∞

Z

q EB /λ(n(θ)) − θ
σ (n(θ))

∞

1−Φ

+
−∞

q

EB

!

!
dF (θ) (−χ)

/λ(n(θ)) − θ
σ (n(θ))



 
φ −q EB / λ(n(θ))σθ̂F E (n(θ))



  dF (θ).
σθ̂F E (n(θ)) Φ −q EB / λ(n(θ))σ F E
θ̂
(n(θ))

!! 

σθ2

(14)
Because n(θ) is no longer constant, as it was in HT-0, the reliability of signals varies by
teacher and the analytical characterization of the administrator’s reservation signal from Model
HT-0 no longer obtains. However, as long as the MLRP holds, higher signal realizations will
cause the administrator to revise her belief about teacher quality upwards, meaning Proposi45

tion 3 would still apply here. The estimator-specific reservation signals, q ∗F E and q ∗EB , are
respectively obtained by numerically solving (13) and (14).
The ranking of the administrator’s utility from HT-2, by class size scenario n(θ), is the
same as her ranking under the cutoff-based model. To show this, I solve for the administrator’s
objective for a wide range of replacement costs and under different class size scenarios: constant,
negative quadratic, and positive quadratic.36 Figure 9 shows how the relationship between class
size and teacher quality would affect outcomes in HT-2. The left panel, Figure 9a, plots the
ratio in her value from using the FE over the EB estimator. The constant class size scenario
(dotted black line) represents a special case of HT-2 where n(θ) = n. Unsurprisingly, then,
we obtain the same value for all replacement costs χ, as this is simply model HT-0. Under
the negative quadratic scenario (dot-dashed blue line) the administrator would obtain higher
value from using fixed effects for every χ. This is exactly the same result as was obtained for
different desired cutoffs (and Type I and II error weights; see Appendix B.3) under the cutoffbased model. Also, as in the cutoff-based model, the estimator ranking is reversed under the
positive-quadratic class size scenario (dashed red line); i.e., she would prefer to use empirical
Bayes instead of fixed effects.
The right panel, Figure 9b, plots expected output under the administrator’s optimal program
for each estimator and replacement cost. As expected, the difference in estimator performance
when class size is not constant increases even more in replacement cost, as the output measure
does not take χ into account. Intuitively, retaining teachers with true quality above a certain
desired threshold—which depends on the replacement cost χ—is similar to correctly identifying
teachers with true quality above a particular desired cutoff κ in the cutoff model (i.e., not making
a Type I error). Unlike the cutoff model, in the hidden type models, the administrator faces the
same (replacement) cost for obtaining new teachers; that is, the cost portion of her objective
does not directly depend on teachers’ true quality θ.
As with model HT-1, an environment with multiple periods could be modeled by suitably
adjusting the desired threshold quality. For example, adding more periods could be accommodated by decreasing the replacement cost, as the administrator would have a relatively higher
gain from replacing when there are more periods of output. Because they range from a cost of
zero to twice the estimated difference in value added between a teacher with five years experience and no experience, the calculations presented in Figure 9 then likely encompass costs for
multi-period environments as well.
The takeaway from this section is that (i) the administrator’s preferred estimator depends
on the class size scenario n(θ), (ii) though the difference in values from using either estimator
36

Wiswall (2013) reports that teachers with 30 years of experience have value-added that is one standard deviation higher than new teachers and 0.75 standard deviations higher than teachers with five years of experience;
this implies a 0.25 sd difference acquired in the first five years of experience. Therefore, I set χ = 0.25σθ = 0.054
and then use a range for the replacement cost running from zero to 0.10, approximately twice this value.
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Figure 9: Difference between administrator’s value under fixed effects and empirical Bayes, by
class size scenario and replacement cost χ
(b) Ratio of period-2 output, FE/EB
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depends on other model parameters (T, χ), the preferred estimator does not, and (iii) the
administrator would prefer the same estimator in HT-2 as she would in the cutoff model.

D
D.1

Details for Quantitative Exercises
Calibrated Error Variances

I calibrate σθ2 and σ2 from Table B-2 of Schochet and Chiang (2012) normalizing the total
variance to one. To most closely match a policy where an administrator would like to rank
teachers across a school district, I calibrate σθ2 = 0.046 by summing the average of school- and
teacher-level variances in random effects. To most closely approximate an environment where
both student and aggregate-level shocks may affect student test scores, I calibrate σ2 = 0.953
by summing the average of class- and student-level variances in random effects. Note that,
due to the much greater student-level error variance, the approximate sizes of σθ2 and σ2 are
approximately the same if school-level variances are excluded from σθ2 or class-level variances
are excluded from σ2 , lending robustness to the quantitative findings.
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D.2

Heteroskedasticity Correction for Relationship Between Class
Size and Teacher Quality

The advantage of the indirect inference approach is that it can be implemented using a vector of
auxiliary moments which do not necessarily correspond to structural econometric parameters.
This is useful in the current context where the micro-data to directly correct for heteroskedasticity are not available.37
Indirect Inference Algorithm The following is done separately for Reading and Math.
0. Estimate the relationship between class size (ni ) and teacher i’s estimated quality in the
subject (θ̂i )by running the regression
ni = β0data + β1data θ̂i + β2data (θ̂i )2 + ei . The regression

coefficients β̂0data , β̂1data , β̂2data and residual standard error σ̂edata form the first set auxiliary
parameters to fit. Compute the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles of the empirical distribudata
data
tion of class sizes, (ndata
the remaining auxiliary parameters. The
p25 , np50 , np75 ). These are


data
data
,
n
,
n
target vector of auxiliary parameters is then β̂0data , β̂1data , β̂2data , σˆe data , ndata
p75 .
p50
p25
1. Given σθ2 , simulate teacher quality θisim once for each teacher in the sample. (Recall the
population mean has been normalized to 0).
2. Simulate the random component of class sizes nsim
i,i.i.d , which is distributed normal with
mean zero and standard deviation σnsim . As described below, this algorithm chooses the
parameter σnsim . Note these are independent from teacher quality to get an idea of the
role heteroskedasticity plays.
3. Assign incremental class sizes according to ninc (θisim ) = a0 + a1 θisim + a2 (θisim )2 . As
described below, this algorithm chooses the parameters (a0 , a1 , a2 ). The final simulated
inc sim
= round{nsim
(θi )}, i.e., class sizes are integerclass size for teacher i is then nsim
i
i,i.i.d + n
valued.
4. Given σ2 and nsim
simulate an average shock for each teacher, sim
i
i ; form simulated
estimated teacher quality according to θ̂isim = θisim + sim
i .
5. Regress nsim
= β0sim +β1sim θ̂isim +β2sim (θ̂isim )2 , estimating the auxiliary coefficients (β̂0sim , β̂1sim , β̂2sim )
i
and auxiliary residual standard error σ̂esim . Compute the 25th, 50th, and 75th percentiles
sim
sim
of the simulated distribution of class sizes, (nsim
simulated vector of
p25 , np50 , np75 ). The


sim
sim
auxiliary parameters is then β̂0sim , β̂1sim , β̂2sim , σ̂esim , nsim
p25 , np50 , np75 .
37
If micro-data had been available, then one could in principle use an approach like the one in Lockwood and
McCaffrey (2014) to account for the nonlinearities produced by heteroskedastic errors.
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6. Compute the Euclidean distance between target auxiliary parameters and simulated auxiliary parameters (e.g., β̂0data and β̂0sim , respectively) as a function of the parameters governing class size, d(a0 , a1 , a2 , σnsim ).
Repeat steps 1-6 for the vector (a0 , a1 , a2 , σnsim ) until the distance between data and simulated auxiliary moments is minimized.

D.3

Details for Quantitative Illustration for Hidden Action Model

Output in the hidden action model depends on several parameters, including the variance of
measurement error on output, ση2 . I adjust the error variance in several steps, using Reading
test scores as the measure:
1. Simulate teacher quality, class sizes, and measurement errors using the parameters from
Section 5.1, for 30,000 teachers. Each simulated teacher then has a simulated quality θis
and a simulated fixed-effect estimate θ̂is,F E .
2. Use the empirical Bayes weights λ(·) to generate simulated EB measures of teacher quality
according to θ̂is,EB = λ(n(θis ))θ̂is,F E .
3. Standardize θis , θ̂is,F E , and θ̂is,EB to have variances of 1, to make the residual variances
comparable.
4. Finally, I estimate the residual variance from a regression of standardized θ̂is,F E on the
standardized true (simulated) quality θis and the residual variance from a regression of
standardized empirical Bayes measure θ̂is,EB on standardized true (simulated) quality. The
ratio of residual variances, or amount unexplained in each regression, tells us how much
more (or less) the fixed effects estimator would inform the administrator about teacher
quality.
The regression results, shown in Table 4, indicate that the fixed-effects estimator explains about
3.2% more variation in teacher quality than the empirical Bayes estimator (1−0.69562 /0.70702 =
0.032). That is, the fact that the EB estimator makes it more difficult to separate high- and
low-performing teachers when the class size function is negative quadratic, as it is in the data,
can be modeled as increasing the measurement error variance on teacher output, ση2 , by this
amount.
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Table 4: Regressions of simulated teacher quality on FE and EB estimates
Dependent variable:
θs (standardized)
(1)
0.718∗∗∗
(0.004)

θ̂s,F E (standardized)

0.707∗∗∗
(0.004)

θ̂s,EB (standardized)

Constant

0.002
(0.004)

−0.001
(0.004)

Observations
R2
Residual Std. Error (df = 29998)

30,000
0.516
0.696

30,000
0.500
0.707

Note: ∗ p<0.1;

E

(2)

∗∗

p<0.05;

∗∗∗

p<0.01

Alternative Specification of Administrator’s Objective

Characterizing optimal contracts is difficult to do in a general setting. Therefore, in this
section I take a different approach and instead examine a problem qualitatively consistent with
economic environments of interest. Specifically, I consider an alternative objective in which
the administrator’s value is increasing in the product of teacher quality and reward assigned
to that teacher. For example, the administrator may want to assign higher wages to, or only
retain, higher-quality teachers. This objective is reasonable so long as an increase in estimated
quality does not decrease the reward assigned to a teacher and the administrator would like
for higher-quality teachers to receive rewards no lower than those assigned to lower-quality
teachers.
I first proceed by considering linear incentive schemes, which have been extensively studied
in the literature. Next, I show how the same result holds when incentives are weakly increasing
in estimated teacher quality, so long as the administrator’s objective has the intuitive property
of being weakly increasing in the product of the incentive and true teacher quality. For example,
this specification is consistent with the cutoff and hidden type models.
Consider the following objective for the administrator from assigning a reward w(θ̂) to
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teacher with true quality θ and quality signal θ̂:
umono (θ̂, θ; w(·)) = w(θ̂)θ,

(15)

where θ̂2 > θ̂1 implies w(θ̂2 ) ≥ w(θ̂1 ), i.e., the “reward”—which could represent monetary
compensation such as bonuses or raises, or a retention decision—is weakly increasing in estimated quality. The administrator’s value is obtained by integrating (15) over the distribution
of teacher quality:
Z Z
vmono (λ(·)) =
θ


w (θ̂)dGθ̂ (θ̂|θ; λ(·)) θdF (θ),
∗

(16)

θ̂

where w∗ (·) is the optimal reward schedule and Gθ̂ (·) is the distribution quality signal θ̂, which
depends on true quality and the relationship between class size and teacher quality λ(·). Although the specification of the administrator’s objective in (15) may not necessarily correspond
to any economic environment, results pertaining to the estimator rankings are unchanged when
we instead study the following objective:
umono,g (θ̂, θ; w(·)) = uw (w(θ̂))uθ (θ),

(17)

where uw and uθ are both weakly increasing. For example, the administrator wanting to retain
higher-quality teachers or give them bonus payments, or having a wage schedule increasing in
estimated quality are both consistent with (17). What matters is that, by providing the correct
incentives, the administrator assigns higher rewards (or lower punishments) when she sees a
higher signal of teacher quality. This is a very natural assumption.
Linear Reward First, suppose w∗ (θ̂) = β0∗ + β1∗ θ̂, i.e., the optimal reward schedule is a linear
function of estimated teacher quality. Note that, although this reward function is the same as
in Model HA, the case here does not necessarily assume the underlying unobserved input is
a choice of action by the teacher. This type of contract has been studied extensively in the
literature, perhaps due to its tractability and simplicity (see, e.g., Tincani (2012), Behrman
et al. (2016), Rothstein (2014)). Substituting in for estimated teacher quality, we get the
administrator’s optimized objective for a teacher with true quality θi :
h
i
h
i
E umono (θ̂, θ; w∗ (·) = E θi (β0∗ + β1∗ θ̂i )
= E [θi β0∗ + β1∗ θi λ(θi ) (θi + i )]


= E θi β0∗ + β1∗ λ(θi )θi2 + β1∗ λ(θi )θi i
= θi β0∗ + β1∗ λ(θi )θi2 ,
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(18)

where we go from the third to fourth line because E [i |θi ] = 0. By the envelope theorem, the
optimal reward parameters (β0∗ , β1∗ ) would not vary with an infinitesimal change in λ(·). We
can see that a negative-quadratic relationship of class size (and subsequently, λ(θi )) and teacher
quality θ reduces the above amount, e.g., for a high- or low-quality teacher. Integrating over all
teacher qualities, this means the administrator would prefer to use the fixed effects estimator
for this type of incentive scheme. If class size is constant in teacher quality, then by adjusting
(β0∗ , β1∗ ), the administrator could obtain the same expected objective by using either the fixed
effect or empirical Bayes estimator of teacher quality; this result is identical to that also derived
for the cutoff, hidden type, and hidden action models.
Increasing Reward However, without further structure, there is no theoretical reason to
assume the optimal incentive scheme would be linear in estimated teacher quality. Therefore, I
next consider the case where an administrator may employ any scheme that is weakly increasing
in estimated quality.
According to (15), the administrator’s optimized objective for a teacher with true quality
θi and shock i is
umono (θi , θ̂i ; w∗ (·)) = w∗ (θ̂i )θi = w∗ (λ(θi )θ̂iF E )θi = w∗ (λ(θi ) (θi + i ))θi
= w∗ (λ(θi )θi + λ(θi )i )θi ,

(19)

where the potential nonlinearity of w∗ (·) means we cannot remove the i from inside the wage
function as we did when the wage was linear. The closer w∗ (·) is to linear, the closer is the
following approximation:
h
i
E umono (θi , θ̂i ; w∗ (·)) ≈ w∗ (λ(θi )θi )θi .

(20)

By examining (20), we can see that, intuitively, if we consider teachers with positive true
quality, the expression will be higher when we change infinitesimally λ(·) to be more increasing
in θ. Conversely, the expression will be higher when λ(·) is infinitesimally changed to be more
decreasing in θ for teachers with negative true quality. Due to the infinitesimal nature of
these changes to λ(·) and the prior optimality of w∗ (·), we can apply the envelope theorem
and disregard the effect of changes to w∗ (·) on the administrator’s expected objective. Put
together, a positive-quadratic relationship between class size and teacher quality would increase
the administrator’s expected utility from using the empirical Bayes estimator of teacher quality,
while a negative-quadratic relationship would decrease the administrator’s utility from using
empirical Bayes.
However, (20) makes the unattractive assumption that w∗ (·) is “close to” linear. To more

52

generally verify that the administrator’s objective (15) is higher under fixed effects when class
sizes are negative quadratic and higher under empirical Bayes when class sizes are positive
quadratic, I randomly generated 100 nondecreasing wage schedules. For each schedule, I computed the derivative of (16) with respect to a convexifying parameter δ, which represents the
“share” of the estimator θ̂ represented by the fixed effects estimator used in evaluating (16).
That is, θ̂i = δ θ̂iF E +(1−δ)λi θ̂iF E . Increasing δ puts more weight on fixed effects, and, therefore,
less weight on empirical Bayes and λ(·); where λ(·) is adjusted to equalize the mean weight, integrating over the joint distribution of teacher quality and measurement error, under the initial
share δ and perturbed one.
Figure 10 presents six randomly generated reward functions and the associated derivative
with respect to δ under the negative-quadratic and positive-quadratic class size scenarios.38
For example, Figure 10a presents an optimal reward function w∗ (·) that is essentially a cutoff
rule assigning a bonus (or retaining) teachers above a certain value in the estimated quality
distribution θ̂, showing how the objective (15) can capture meaningful economic environments,
such as the cutoff model and hidden type model. We can see at the top left that the derivative
with respect to share is 4 × 10−5 when class size is negative quadratic in teacher quality. This
positive value means the administrator would prefer to increase the weight on fixed effects
in this case. We can also see at the top left that the derivative with respect to share is
−8 × 10−5 when class size is positive quadratic in teacher quality, i.e., the administrator would
prefer to decrease the weight on fixed effects in this case, as expected. The reward function
in Figure 10f, on the other hand, has a flat spot below which the reward is flat—say, where
teachers are not retained—and then a reward that is roughly increasing linearly in measured
quality, similar to that in (18). This pattern holds for the rich variety of simulated wage
functions, so long as monotonicity of w∗ (·) is not violated. On average, the derivative of the
administrator’s objective (16) is 9.13 × 10−3 and −7.81 × 10−3 when class size is respectively
negative- and positive-quadratic in teacher quality. That is, fixed effects would be preferred by
the administrator when class size is negative quadratic in teacher quality and empirical Bayes
would be preferred in the opposite scenario.

38

Details of the simulation algorithm are available upon request.
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Figure 10: Reward functions w∗ (·) and derivative w.r.t. share δ for selected simulations, by
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